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OLD WINE, NEW SKINS: NAFTA AND THE





The recently completed North American Free Trade Agreement'
(NAFTA) is an event of great pith and moment, not just for trade law-
yers, but for the world in general. NAFTA will be the world's largest
trading bloc,2 and has caused a heated, multipartisan debate within
Canada, Mexico, and the United States. 3 Moreover, the economic dis-
t The author wrote this Note in the spring of 1993, and it was reviewed and accepted for
publication in the summer of the same year. On the eve of its publication, Congress passed
NAFTA along with two side agreements which addressed labor and environmental concerns.
Although these developments may render some statements in the Note somewhat dated, the
Note as a whole remains predominantly current.
* University of Washington, B.A. (1985); University of Michigan Law School, J.D.
(1994).
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605 [hereinafter
NAFTA].
2. See, e.g., Eleanor R. Lewis, Negotiation of NAFTA Text Completed, INT'L L. NEWS
(A.B.A. Sec. Int'l L. & Proc.), Fall 1992, at 1, 5-7 (documenting size of proposed NAFTA
text); Scott Pendleton, Clinton, Mexican President Endorse Trade Agreement in First Foreign
Summit, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 11, 1993, at 9 (NAFTA's 360 billion consumers and
$6 trillion economy will be largest market in the world).
3. For discussions of the various asserted consequences of NAFTA, see GARY C. HUF-
BAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE: ISSUES AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS 35 (1992) (asserting that NAFI'A accession will "continue and solidify the ongoing
[Mexican] reform process"); Drusilla K. Brown et al., North American Integration 1, 5
(Discussion Paper No. 312, Research Forum on International Economics, Institute of Public
Pol'y Studies, the University of Michigan) (later published in Economic Journal, Sept. 1992)
(implying Mexican participation in NAFTA will "strengthen [its] democratic institutions"); id.
at 5 (trade liberalization by Mexico will greatly improve the Mexican economy); Leonard B.
Feldman, U.S. Mexico Free Trade Agreement, 4 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 553, 579 (1991) (citing
consolidation of Mexican economic reforms and desire to stop flow of illegal aliens as U.S.
goals in NAFTA); Gary C. Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott, Options for a Hemispheric Trade
Order, 22 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 261, 282-83 (1991) [hereinafter Hufbauer & Schott]
(cataloging participants' interests in NAFTA: Mexico seeks to attract investment, to regain
flight capital, and to solidify economic reforms; Canada primarily wants to safeguard its prior
gains; the United States seeks to boost the economies of border states and Mexico, to create
market for U.S. exports, to draw on Mexican labor and resources, to stabilize Mexican
democracy, to reinforce Mexican economic reforms, to stem the flow of illegal immigrants,
and to show the European Communities that the Americas can also form a trading bloc);
David Zirnhelt, Fear Trade: B.C. is Right: Canada Has No Chance of Getting A Fair Shake
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parities between NAFTA members will be the greatest of any free trade
area or customs union to date.' This aspect fuels the general controversy
and also makes NAFTA an experiment for any trade agreements be-
tween the European Communities (EC) and their impoverished, formerly
communist, eastern neighbors.' Finally, many see NAFTA as the next
step 6 towards a Western Hemisphere Free Trade Agreement (WHFIA) 7
Because NAFTA may be the basis for WHFTA, it is all the more im-
portant that NAFTA be carefully crafted, not only for immediate con-
cerns, but also for future developments.
This Note examines NAFTA's effort in meeting the needs of the
moment (i.e., North American integration) and those of the future (i.e.,
hemispheric integration) regarding the issue of dispute resolution.'
With NAFTA, VANCOUVER SUN, July 7, 1992, at A13 (NAFTA creating unfair hub and spoke
deal, with the United States as the hub and Canada and Mexico as the spokes of the trade
deal).
4. See Baucus Outlines Safeguards He Says are Necessary foi Acceptable NAFTA, 9 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1020 (June 10, 1992) (quoting letter characterizing NAFTA as first free
trade agreement between a developed and developing country).
5. Cf Western Europe Not Doing Enough to Help East, Brock Tells Briefing, 8 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 983 (June 26, 1991) (former U.S. Trade Representative calls for more
Eastern European access to Western European markets, drawing a parallel with Mexico-U.S.
trade negotiations).
6. The first step was the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, 27
I.L.M. 281 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989) [hereinafter CUSFTA].
7. See, e.g., Brown et al., supra note 3, at 11. (discussing the strong possibility of
hemispheric expansion); Jonathan T. Fried, Squaring the Circle: Unilateralism, Bilateralism
and Multilateralism in US Trade Policy, 8 B.U. INT'L L.J. 231, 237 (1991) (mentioning
possibility of expanding NAFTA to a hemispheric agreement); Hufbauer & Schott, supra note
3, at 263, 276-77, 291-92 (predicting the development of a hemispheric trade order, with
CUSFTA serving as a model for NAFTA and a Western Hemisphere Free Trade Agreement
[hereinafter WHFTA], and with Chile as the next member of an expanded NAFTA or
WHFTA); Richard Feinberg & Peter Hakim, NAFTA: Key to Hemispheric Unity, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 27, 1992, at 19 (describing concerns for possible NAFTA expansion into
WHFTA).
Proponents of NAFTA and WHFTA underscore both the economic and non-economic
benefits to be reaped by Latin American countries from free trade. See, e.g., Hufbauer &
Schott, supra note 3, at 263 (predicting hemispheric trade arrangement will also produce
"social pacts" on such matters as health, safety, and environment); Feinberg & Hakim, supra
(placing free trade at the leading edge of hemispheric convergence towards democracy, free
markets, and multilateral cooperation); Third World Debt, ECONOMIST, Sept. 12, 1992, at 21,
23 .(implying free trade is necessary to sustain fragile Latin American economic reforms).
These predicted benefits increase the importance of carefully drafting NAFTA, ensuring both
its own viability and that of any following agreement. For expected Mexican benefits from
NAFTA, see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
But see Marc Levinson, Let's Have No More Free-Trade Deals, Please, NEWSWEEK,
Aug. 17, 1992, at 40 (opposing idea of WHFTA as- politically and economically infeasible
and characterizing NAFTA as a purely political, economically dubious arrangement).
8. Dispute resolution is so crdcial and delicate an issue between the United States and
Canada that disagreements over it caused debates about abolishing CUSFTA and ending
NAFTA talks. See, e.g., Daphne Bramham, Canada Gets Short End of the Stick: U.S. Ruling
on Softwood Ignores Free Trade Deal, VANCOtVER SUN, May 16, 1992, at Al, (British
[Vol. 15:255"
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Dispute resolution is key to any trade agreement;, without an effective
means of settling specific disputes and enforcing provisions generally,
parties will have a little incentive to honor their trade commitments. 9
Moreover, ineffective dispute resolution hurts smaller, less developed
countries in agreements with larger, more developed countries, because
the larger countries will be tempted to use their economic leverage to
solve disputes to the disadvantage of the smaller ones.' ° A strong, rule-
based dispute resolution mechanism (DRM) protects the weaker nations
from the excesses of the stronger ones.' These concerns drive Canada
and Mexico to seek reliable DRMs,'2 especially since the alternative
Columbia Premier calls for withdrawal from NAFTA negotiations because of unfavorable
subsidies ruling); Estranged Partners: Trade Disputes Threaten the FTA, MACLEAN'S, Mar.
16, 1992, at 34, 34-35 (Canadian officials privately warning of danger to CUSFTA and
NAFTA stemming from automotive rules of origin and softwood lumber disputes; Canadian
opposition party pledging to abrogate NAFTA if elected to power); Mary Williams Walsh,
Canada is Unhappy With U.S. Trade Pact, L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 1I, 1992, at DI, D12 (stating
that adverse trade.decisions are prompting Canadian reevaluation of CUSFTA; that a Canadi-
an trade minister has hinted that NAFTA will not go forward until CUSFTA disputes are
resolved; Canadian CUSFTA negotiators have expressed doubt over it in the wake of sub-
sequent disputes).
9. For a general discussion of this issue see JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM 83-88 (1989).
10. See id. at 85-86 (discussing the disadvantages of weaker countries in disputes with
larger ones).
11. See id. at 86 (describing advantages of rule-based dispute resolution).
12. See, e.g., Robert Hage, Dispute Settlement under the Canada-United States Free
Trade Agreement, 1990 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 361, 363 '(perceiving U.S. abuse of trade reme-
dies as a major irritant in Canada-U.S. relations); Ted L. McDorman, The Dispute Settlement
Regime of the Free Trade Agreement, 2 REV. INT'L Bus. L. 303, 305 (1988) (citing Canadian
concerns over the effect of U.S. negotiating strength upon dispute settlement); Alan M.
Rugman, A Canadian Perspective on U.S. Administered Protection and the Free Trade
Agreement, 40 ME. L. REv. 305, 305 (1988) [hereinafter Rugman] (citing size asymmetry as
source of Canadian drive for rules-based trading system); James F. Smith & Marilyn Whitney,
The Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the NAFTA and Agriculture, 68 N.D. L. REV. 567, 594
(1992) (noting Mexican desire for binding arbitration in NAFTA to counter-act U.S. tendency
to settle disputes with trade strength); Ann Carlsen, Note, The Canada United States Free
Trade Agreement: A Bilateral Approach to the Reduction of Trade Barriers, 12 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L.J. 299, 308, 315 (1989) (Canada especially concerned with dispute resolution
because of perceived arbitrary application of trade remedy laws by the United States).
But cf. Stephen G. Hirsch, Free Trade Pact Rapped Over Dispute Resolution, RECORD-
ER, Sept. 4, 1992, available in LEXIS, Genfed Library,- RECRDR File (quoting a law
professor who characterizes NAFTA's dispute resolution provisions as weak and "less
immune to power politics than it should be"); see alslo infra note 116 and accompanying text
(discussing concerns with antidumping and countervailing duty dispute resolution).
The best statement of Canadian concerns regarding DRMs'is in Hage, supra:
For Canada, [the dispute resolution] provisions are an essential part of the FTA
[Free Trade Agreement]. Canada's objective , ... had not only been to obtain
greater access to the United States market .... but also to ensure that any trade
differences between the two countries were resolved in a dispassionate, predictable
fashion. As the smaller trading partner, And thus the one with the greatest trade
dependance on the other, Canada could not count on its political and economic
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General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)13 DRMs are con-
sidered inadequate. 4
Although NAFTA modifies the DRMs of its predecessor, the Cana-
da-United States Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA),"5 it has by, no
means perfected the system. NAFTA's dispute resolution system shares
some of the weaknesses of CUSFTA and GATT, the systems on which
it is based. These weaknesses, which are discussed below in Section II,.
should have been acknowledged and addressed. Moreover, NAFTA adds
a potentially serious problem of its own: the failure to integrate
CUSFTA and NAFTA dispute resolution systems. This omission sets the
stage for future misunderstandings and discord.16 By failing to recognize
these potential sources of tension, NAFTA's proponents lost an oppor-
tunity to guide the evolution of trade dispute resolution and to smooth
the path to hemispheric economic integration. 7
weight to resolve these trade differences and therefor provided the impetus for...
procedures under which trade disputes would be settled through institutionalized
consultation procedures and, if they fail, through dispute settlement panels.
Id. at 361-62.
13. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. 3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
14. See, e.g., JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GAT SYSTEM 74 (1990) [herein-
after JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING GATT] (noting considerable comment about weaknesses of
GATT dispute settlement processes); JACKSON, supra note 9, at 109; Jean Anderson &
Jonathan T. Fried, The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement in Operation, 17 CAN.-U.S. L.J.
397, 398-400 (1991) (characterizing GATT problems of delay, unavailability of knowledge-
able, independent panelists, and need for consensus); McDorman, supra note 12, at 305 (the
United States and Canada wanted CUSFTA's dispute resolution procedure to be more ad-
judicative because both believed that GATT obligations were too easily avoided); Carlsen,
supra note 12, at 316 (GATT dispute resolution perceived inadequate); Shaun A. Ingersoll,
Note, Current Efficacy of the GATT Dispute Settlement Process, 22 TEX. INT'L L.J. 87, 95-98
(1987) (describing GATT dispute resolution measures as ineffective because of built-in
opportunities for delay and parties' ability to legally avoid compliance); Christopher J.
Murphy, Canada-U.S. Free Trade Resolution Dispute Mechanism Panel Procedures: Will
They Hold?, 4 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 585, 620-21 (1991) (calling GA'T part of a world trade
system "in decay.").
15. CUSFTA, supra note 6.
16. See infra part III.B.3.
17. Recent developments underscore the need for foresight and diplomacy while working
towards a hemispheric trade arrangement. See, e.g., Luis Abugattas, The Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Developments and Prospects, 22 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L.
REV. 353, 360-62, 369 (1991) (discussing the recent tendency of Latin American and other
developing countries to disrupt trade negotiations which are not going their way and noting
Latin American perception of AD/CVD measures as a "new type of protectionism."). Abugat-
tas provides a provocative discussion of the new international role for Latin American and
other developing countries. Id. For further discussion see Hufbauer & Schott, supra note 3, at
277, 287-91 (cautioning a slow approach to WHFTA because of disparities between the
United States and Latin America and advising accession of Latin American countries to
WHFTA only after they meet specified economic and political criteria); Horacio A. Grigera
Naon, Arbitration in Latin America: Overcoming Traditional Hostility (An Update), 22 U.
[Vol. 15:255
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B. Difficulties, Approach, and Structure
The lack of a ratified NAFTA text and a scarcity of literature which
addresses NAFTA DRMs presented difficulties in writing this Note.
Lack of a truly final NAFTA text is troubling mainly because of the
heated opposition by several influential members of Congress and some
highly visible non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to NAFTA in
general 8 as well as its DRMs in particular.' 9 However, given President
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 203, 204, 255-57 (1991) (noting slowly developing Latin Ameri-
can acceptance of international commercial arbitration in general); FTA is Canada's Defense
Against U.S. Protectionism, N. AM. REP. ON FREE TRADE, Dec. 23, 1991, at 7, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File (citing slow reform and political problems as obstacles to
free trade with Latin America).
For a predictable, but nevertheless disquieting potential complication, see Western
Governors Approve NAFTA Statement Urging Protection of State Standards, 9 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 1095 (June 24, 1992) (reporting U.S. Western Governors' Association's call for
state participation in dispute resolution panels addressing state practices).
18. See, e.g., AFL-CIO Speaks Out on Free Trade, BUSINESS MEXICO, May 1991, at 10,
10-11 (Secretary-Treasurer of AFL-CIO opposing proposed NAFTA); Citizen Groups Score
Leaked NAFTA Drqft; USTR Declines to Verify its Accuracy, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 516
(Mar. 25, 1992) (Sierra Club Public Citizen criticizing leaked NAFTA text on environmental,
consumer interest grounds; Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy claiming family farmers
would be harmed by proposed text); House Democrats Letter on NAFTA, INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
Oct. 16, 1992, at 13 (reprinting letter of Oct. 3, 1992 opposing NAFTA for labor reasons and
sent by 96 Democratic Representatives to Presidential Candidate Clinton); ITC Chairman
Newquist Says Approval Process for NAFTA May be Difficult, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 936
(May 27, 1992) (U.S. International Trade Commission Chairman Don Newquist predicting
congressional. opposition to NAFTA on environmental, labor, and border infrastructure
grounds); NAFTA Dispute Settlement Issues Discussed at Lawyer's Meeting, 9 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 639 (Apr. 8, 1992) (Sen. Donald W. Riegle, Jr. (D-Mich.) attempting to change
NAFTA's fast-track no-amendment procedures; National Wildlife Federation reiterating
"concerns" about NAFTA); Senate Finance Debates Fast Track, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
726, 727 (May 15, 1991) (Senators Ernest F. Hollings (D-S.C.), Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-
N.Y.), Thomas A. Daschle (D-S.D.), and Donald W. Riegle, Jr. supporting resolution in
Senate Finance Committee that would disapprove extension of fast-track authority to NAF-
TA).
19. See, e.g., Edmund G. ["Jerry"] Brown, Jr., Free Trade Fetish; Things Have Changed
Since David Ricardo's Time, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1992, at A15 (describing danger of
NAFTA-type DRMs as a "fundamental conflict between intrusive international trade regula-
tions and American democracy"); Nancy Dunne, Political Worries May Force Bush to Delay
NAFTA Deal, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1991, at 9 (Congressman Richard Gephardt opposing
extension of antidumping and countervailing duty dispute resolution mechanisms (hereinafter
DRMs) to Mexico); NAFTA Dispute Settlement Issues Discussed at Lawyer's Meeting, supra
note 18, at 639 (Sen. Riegle attempting to change NAFTA's dispute settlement provisions;
National Wildlife Federation reiterating "concerns" about NAFTA dispute settlement); Riegle,
Other Senators Will Press for Change in Fast-Track Rule on NAFTA, 9 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1443 (Aug. 19, 1992) (Senators Donald W. Riegle, Jr. (D-Mich.), Harris Wofford (D-
Pa.), and Kent Conrad (D-N.D.) seeking Senate resolution to amend NAFTA dispute resolu-
tion); Senate Finance, House Ways and Means Clear Way For Floor Action on Fast-Track
Request, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 726, 726-27 (May 15, 1991) (Sen. Riegle introducing
resolution to amend NAFTA dispute resolution provisions).
Fall 19931
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Clinton's willingness to accept the main text,20 it is fairly safe to assume
that the dispute settlement provisions will survive intact if the treaty is
indeed ratified.
For purposes of this Note, the scarcity of literature on NAFTA
DRMs is more serious. Because of the similarity between NAFTA and
CUSFTA DRMs, sources draw heavily on CUSFTA DRM scholarship.
Thus, evaluation of NAFTA DRM structure is conducted through analy-
sis of analogue CUSFTA provisions. Where appropriate, similar use of
GATT literature will be made.
The approach of this Note is to describe the NAFTA structure and
compare it with the CUSFTA system on which it is based. The descrip-
tion is followed by a selective critique of specific elements in the sys-
tem.
I. DESCRIPTION OF THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM
Both NAFTA and CUSFTA DRM structures may be divided into
three sections: General Dispute Resolution, Antidumping (AD) and
Countervailing Duty (CVD) Dispute Resolution, and Special Dispute
Provisions. The three general sections of the two treaties will be de-
scribed and compared in the following subsections.
A. General Dispute Resolution Provisions
NAFTA's Chapter 202" governs its general DRM. CUSFTA's
Chapter 1822 concerns its general dispute settlement procedures. The
following comparison of NAFTA and CUSFTA general DRMs is divid-
ed into descriptions of dispute settlement institutions and dispute settle-
ment procedure.
1. General Dispute Resolution Institutional Provisions
NAFTA's primary institutional body is the Free Trade Commission
(FTC), which is comprised of cabinet-level representatives of the Parties
or their designees.23 The CUSFTA equivalent is the Canada-United
20. See, e.g., Extension of Fast-Track Not Necessary for Supplements, U.S. Trade
Oficial Says, 16 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 109 (Feb. 10, 1993) (reporting President Clinton's
endorsement of NAFTA as negotiated, but calling for supplemental agreements on labor and
environment); Scott Pendleton, Clinton, Mexican President Endorse Trade Agreement in First
Foreign Summit,' CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. Il, 1993, at 9.
21. NAF'TA, supra note I, ch. 20, 32 I.L.M. at 693-99 (Institutional Arrangements and
Dispute Settlement Procedures).
22. CUSFTA, supra note 6, ch. 18, 27 I.L.M. at 383-86 (Institutional Provisions).
23. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2001(l), 32 l.L.M. at 693.
[Vol. 15:255
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24States Trade Commission (CTC), which has a similar composition.
Both the FTC and the CTC are directed to resolve disputes concerning
interpretation or application of the trade agreements. 25 Both the commis-
sions make decisions by consensus,26 although the FTC may agree to act
otherwise. 27 Additionally, both dispute resolution systems have im-
permanent bodies, which are described in some detail in the next sub-
section. They include expert panels, arbitration panels, arbitral panels,
expert committees, and scientific committees.
Structurally, both the FTC and CTC must establish Secretariats,
which are adjunct bodies composed of national Sections. 28 The NAFTA
Secretariat's main task is to assist the FTC 29 and the panels and commit-
tees established under NAFTA's general dispute and AD/CVD dispute
provisions. 30 By contrast, the CUSFTA's Secretariat is primarily in-
tended to facilitate antidumping or countervailing dispute resolution, and
24. CUSFTA, supra note 6, arts. 1802(1)-(2), 27 I.L.M. at 384 (establishing Canada-
United States Trade Commission (hereinafter CTC) and describing its composition).
25. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2001(2)(c), 32 I.L.M. at 693; CUSFTA, supra note 6, art.
1802(1), 27 I.L.M. at 384.
Additionally, the CTC and NAFTA's Free Trade Commission (hereinafter FTC) must
supervise implementation of the agreements, NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2001(2)(a), 32 I.L.M.
at 693; CUSFTA, supra note 6, art. 1802(1), 27 I.L.M. at 384; they must also oversee further
elaboration of the agreements. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2001(2)(b), 32 I.L.M. at 693;
CUSFTA, supra note 6, art. 1802(l), 27 I.L.M. at 384; finally, they must consider any other
matter which may affect operation of the respective agreements. NAFTA, supra note 1, art.
2001(2)(e), 32 I.L.M. at 693; CUSFTA, supra note 6, art. 1802(1), 27 I.L.M. at 384.
26. NAFTA, supra note I, art. 2001(4), 32 I.L.M. at 693; CUSFTA, supra note 6, art.
1802(5), 27 I.L.M. at 384.
27. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2001(4), 32 I.L.M. at 605, 693.
FTC and CTC residual duties include establishing their own rules and procedures,
NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2001(4), 32 I.L.M. at 693; CUSFTA, supra note 6, art. 1802(5),
27 I.L.M. at 384; and meeting at least annually, NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2001(5), 32
I.L.M. at 693; CUSFTA, supra note 6, art. 1802(3), 27 I.L.M. at 384.
Moreover, both bodies have identical discretionary power to establish and delegate
responsibilities to standing or ad hoc committees or working groups, NAFTA, supra note 1,
art. 2001(3)(a), 32 I.L.M. at 693; CUSFTA, supra note 6, art. 1802(4), 27 I.L.M. at 281, 384,
and to seek the advice of non-governmental persons or groups, NAFTA, supra note I, art.
2001(3)(b), 32 I.L.M. at 693; CUSFTA, supra note 6, art. 1802(4), 27 I.L.M. at 384. Addi-
tionally, the FTC will be allowed to establish and delegate to expert groups. See NAFTA,
supra note 1, art. 2001(3)(a), 32 I.L.M. at 693. Expert groups play a more central role in
CUSFTA dispute resolution. See infra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
28. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2002(l), 32 I.L.M. at 693. Each national Section has a
Secretary to administer and manage it, NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2002(2)(c), 32 I.L.M. at
693; CUSFTA, supra note 6, art. 1909(4)-(6), 27 1.L.M. at 391; and a permanent office,
NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2002(2)(a), 32 I.L.M. at 693; CUSFTA, supra note 6, art. 1909(2),
27 I.L.M. at 391.
29. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2002(3)(a), 32 I.L.M. at 693.
30. Id. art. 2002(3)(b)(i)-(ii), 32 I.L.M. at 693. The Secretariat also has residual duties at
the discretion of the FTC. Id. art. 2002(3)(c)(i)-(ii), 32 I.L.M. at 694.
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not necessarily to assist the CTC directly. 3'
Although the FTC Secretariat provides assistance, it also enlarges
the FTC's responsibilities. The FTC must supervise a complex network
of working groups and committees established under NAFTA. 32 The
number of these groups 33 and the diversity of their areas of expertiseM
impose a substantial burden on the FTC.35 In contrast, the CTC has a
much lighter supervisory role.36
2. General Dispute Resolution Procedures
The general dispute settlement provisions of NAFTA apply in
three situations: first, where a dispute exists between the Parties
over the interpretation or application of NAFTA; 37 second, where a
Party believes that another Party's actual or proposed measure is
inconsistent with NAFTA; 38 and finally, where a Party believes
such a measure is consistent with NAFTA but causes nullification
or impairment of any benefit reasonably to be expected under most
39
31. CUSFTA, supra note 6, art. 1909(1), (7), 27 1.L.M. at 391 (creating CUSFTA
Secretariat to facilitate operation of AD/CVD dispute resolution and giving the CTC dis-
cretion to use its services). Otherwise, the CTC closely resembles the FTC in composition and
structure.
32. NAFTA, supra note I, art. 2001(d), 32 I.L.M. at 693 (referring to Annex 2001.2,
which lists the affected bodies).
33. Id. annex 2001.2, 32 I.L.M. at 698. The annex lists 13 committees and subcom-
mittees and 7 working groups.
34. These range from Trade in Worn Clothing, id. annex 2001.2(A)(2), 32 I.L.M. at 698,
to Telecommunications Standards, id. annex 2001.2(A)(5), 32 1.L.M. at 698, and Agricultural
Subsidies, id. annex 2001.2(B)(2), 32 I.L.M. at 698. See id. annex 2001.2(A) & (B), 32
I.L.M. at 698, for the full panoply of subjects covered.
35. Moreover, the FTC must supervise any other committees or working groups estab-
lished under NAFTA. Id. annex 2001.2(C), 32 I.L.M. at 698.
36. The CTC must supervise eight agricultural working groups, a select panel on
automotive trade and production, a joint advisory committee on outstanding issues related to
retransmission rights, and the working group on unfair pricing. See CUSFTA, supra note 6,
arts. 708, 1004, 1907, and 2006(4), 27 I.L.M. at 320-21, 347, 390, 397 (establishing these
different bodies and providing for CTC supervision).
37. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2004, 32 I.L.M. at 694.
38. Id.
39. A Party may not plead nullification and impairment with respect to benefits accruing
under any of the following:
(1) any provisions of Annex 300-A (Automotive Sector) relating to investment;
(2) any provisions of chap. 6 (Energy) relating to investment;
(3) or to any measure that is subject to an exception under NAFTA, id. art. 2101
(General Exceptions), and involves a provision of:
(a) Part Two (Trade in Goods), to the extent the benefit arises from cross-
border trade in services provision of Part Two; or
(b) Part Three (Technical Barriers to Trade), to the extent the benefit arises
[Vol. 15:255
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NAFTA provisions.4 There are, however, several exceptions and
modifications to Chapter 20's dispute resolution coverage. The most
significant is AD/CVD disputes, 4' described infra Part I.B; other
exceptions and modifications are discussed infra Part I.C. CUSFTA's
general dispute settlement regime has a similar structure42 because it
presumptively covers every dispute under CUSFTA 43 but AD/CVD
disputes." However, the application of "nullification or impairment"
does not have as many exceptions.45 Other differences between
CUSFTA and NAFTA general DRM coverage are discussed in Part
I.C below.46
A Party Complainant bringing a dispute under NAFTA's general
DRM must, if the dispute is also covered by GATT, decide whether
to pursue its claim under GATT or NAFTA.47 If there is more than
one Complainant with similar disputes, they must agree to use GATT
or the dispute defaults to NAFTA.4 s Once the Complainant has
from any cross-border trade in services of Part Two; or
(c) Chapter Twelve (Cross-Border Trade in Services); or
(d) Part Six (Intellectual Property).
See id. annex 2004(1)-(2), 32 I.L.M. at 694.
Subject to these exceptions, a Party may plead nullification and impairment with respect
to any benefit it could reasonably expect to accrue to it under any provision of Part 2 (Trade
in Goods), Part 3 (Technical Barriers to Trade), ch. 12 (Cross-Border Trade in Services), and
Part 6 (Intellectual Property).
Compare CUSFTA, supra note 6, art. 2011(2), 27 I.L.M. at 398 (exempting Canadian
cultural industries from nullification or impairment actions), with NAFTA, supra note 1,
annex 2106, 32 I.L.M. at 702 (evidently preserving Canada's cultural industries exemption).
40. NAFrA, supra note I, art. 2004, annex 2004, 32 I.L.M. at 694, 699 (creating a cause
of action defining "nullification" and "impairment").
41. Id. note 1, art. 2004, 32 I.L.M. 694.
42. See CUSFTA, supra note 6, art. 1801(1)-(3), 27 I.L.M. at 383 (describing applica-
tion of CUSFTA's general DRM).
43. Id. art. 1801(1), 27 I.L.M. at 383.
44. Id.
45. Only CUSFTA's Binational Panel Dispute Settlement in Antidumping and Counter-
vailing Duty Cases and Cultural Industries are exempted from nullification or impairment.
CUSFTA, supra note 6, ch. 19, art. 2005, 27 I.L.M. at 386-95, 396; see also id. art. 2011(2),
27 I.L.M. at 398; supra note 39 (detailing exceptions to NAFTA "nullification or impairment"
coverage).
46. As a final jurisdictional matter, neither NAFTA nor CUSFTA general DRMs create
a private right of action. In other words, only the governments of signatory countries (Parties
or Party) can resort to the general DRMs of NAFTA or CUSFTA. See NAFTA, supra note 1,
art. 2021, 32 I.L.M. at 398 (specifically prohibiting creation of private right of action);
CUSFTA, supra note 6, ch. 18, 27 I.L.M. at 683-86 (while CUSFTA does not specifically
deny a private right of action, it does so impliedly by speaking only in terms of the Parties).
47. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2005(1), 32 I.L.M. at 694.
48. Id. 32 I.L.M. at 694.
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initiated dispute settlement49 in one forum, it is usually to the
exclusion of the other.50 However, if the Complainant initiates GATT
dispute settlement, the defending Party Respondent can invoke the
NAFTA general DRM within. fifteen days, if the dispute: (1) involves
NAFTA Article 104 (Relation to Environmental and Conservation
Agreements); or (2) arises under NAFTA Chapter 7, Section B (Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures) or Chapter 9 (Standards Related Measures);
and (3) concerns a measure to protect life or the environment and raises
factual issues respecting the environment, health, safety, or conserva-
tion.5' CUSFTA requires a similar initial choice between GATT and
CUSFTA by the Complainant; however, the Respondent does not have
the option to demand use of CUSFTA.52 For purposes of this Note, it is
assumed that the Complainant chooses NAFTA or CUSFTA DRMs;
GATT DRMs will not be discussed. At this juncture, NAFTA and
CUSFTA general DRMs diverge sufficiently to merit separate discus-
sion.
a. NAFTA
Any Party may request consultations with any other Party on any
matter which might affect the operation of NAFTA,53 and if a conflict
exists, the consulting Parties must make every effort to resolve the
matter.54 Normally, if the Parties have not resolved the issue within
thirty days of the request for consultations, any consulting Party may
request a meeting of the FTC.55 The FTC must convene within ten days
49. Only NAFTA defines when a dispute procedure is considered initiated. See id. art.
2005(6)-(7), 32 I.L.M. at 694 (establishing that a dispute settlement is initiated under NAFTA
when a Party uses art. 2007 to request a meeting of the FTC, or when settlement proceedings
have been initiated under the GATT by a Party requesting a panel or committee investigation
under that treaty).
50. Id. art. 2005(6), 32 I.L.M. at 694.
51. See id. art. 2005(3)-(5), 32 I.L.M. at 694 (creating art. 104, ch. 7, § B, and ch. 9
exceptions; mandating time limits and compulsory NAFTA jurisdiction).
52. See CUSFTA, supra note 6, art. 1801(2)-(3), 27 I.L.M. at 383.
53. NAMTA, supra note I, art. 2006(l), 32 I.L.M. at 694. This right is subject, of course,
to the exemptions listed supra notes 39-40 and infra part IIC).
54. NAFTA, supra note I, art. 2006(5), 32 I.L.M. at 694. To this end the consulting
Parties shall share pertinent information, protect confidential material, and avoid hurting the
interests of a non-Participating Party. See id. art. 2006(5)(a)-(c), 32 I.L.M. at 694. If the
dispute concerns perishable agricultural goods, consultations must begin within 15 days of a
request. See id. art. 2006(4), 32 1.L.M. at 694. Otherwise, there is no guideline for how
quickly the consultations must begin.
Unless the FTC provides otherwise, a third Party with a substantial interest in the matter
is entitled to participate upon request. Id. art. 2006(3), 32 I.L.M. at 694.
55. Id. art. 2007(1)(a), 32 I.L.M. at 695..But see id. art. 2007(l)(b)-(d), 32 I.L.M. at
695 (providing time limits of 45 days if a third Party has requested or participated in consul-
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of the request in order to resolve the dispute.56 A consulting Party may
request an arbitral panel if the matter is not resolved after thirty days of
FTC efforts.57 Upon delivery of such a request,58 the FTC must establish
an arbitral panel within thirty-five or forty days.59 Panelists are selected
through a complex process which guarantees equal representation and
prohibits a Party from choosing its own citizens. 6° Panelists are normally
chosen from a roster6' of up to thirty individuals established and main-
tained by the Parties.62 The roster members must be experienced in law,
international trade, international trade dispute resolution, or any matter
covered by NAFTA. 63 Additionally, roster members must be in-
dependent of the influence of any Party. 64 Any disputing Party may
tations, of 15 days if the matter concerns perishable agricultural goods, and of other limits as
the Parties may otherwise agree); see also id. art. 2007(2), 32 I.L.M. at 685 (allowing request
for FTC meeting after withdrawal from GATT dispute resolution pursuant to id. art. 2005(5),
32 I.L.M. at 694 or after consultations pursuant to id. arts. 513, 723, 914, 32 I.L.M. at 363,
382, 391 (establishing Working Group on Rules of Origin; Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures-Technical Consultations; and Standards-Related Measures-Technical Consultations)).
56. Id. art. 2007(4), 32 I.L.M. at 695. The FTC may resolve disputes using a variety of
traditional DRMs, including good offices, consulting outside advisers (including technical
advisers, working groups, and expert groups), and making recommendations. Id. arts.
2007(5)(a)-(c), 32 I.L.M. at 695. Other available DRMs include "conciliation, mediation, or
other such dispute resolution procedures .... See id. art. 2007(5)(b), 32 I.L.M. at 695. The
FTC also has discretion to consolidate certain types of proceedings. See id. art. 2007(6), 32
I.L.M. at 695.
57. See id. arts. 2008(l)(a)-(b), 32 LL.M. at 695 (providing for time limit of 30 days
after FTA convenes for the consolidated matter most recently referred to it). But of id. art.
2008(1)(c), 32 I.L.M. at 695 (allowing Parties to agree to any other time limit).
58. See id. arts. 2008(2)-(5), 32 I.L.M. at 695. A third Party with a substantial interest in
the matter has a right to join as a Complainant within seven days of delivery of the request
for an arbitral panel. See id. art. 2008(3), 32 I.L.M. at 695; see also id. 32 I.L.M. at 695
(providing that a third Party who does not join pursuant to art. 2008(3) shall normally refrain
from thereafter initiating or continuing a NAFTA or GATT action on substantially similar
grounds).
At this point, disputes under NAFTA, articles 1415 (Investment Disputes in Financial
Services) and 1136(3) (Finality and Enforcement of [Investment Dispute] Award) may be
referred to an article 2008 panel.
59. The timeline depends on the number of disputing Parties and their cooperativeness.
See id. art. 2011(1)-(2), 32 I.L.M. at 696 (describing selection methods in detail, including
selection by lot in case of deadlock).
60. Essentially, disputing Parties must choose a chair by consensus; if they cannot agree,
a disputing Party chosen by lot selects a chair who is not its citizen. Each disputing side then
selects two additional Panelists who are citizens, of the other disputant(s). See id. art.
2011(1)-(2), 32 I.L.M. at 696.
61. Id. art. 2011(3), 32 I.L.M. at 696.
62. Id. art. 2009(1), 32 I.L.M. at 695 (providing for appointment of roster members by
consensus of the Parties for terms of three years).
63. Id. arts. 2009(2)(a), 2010(1), 32 I.L.M. at 695-96.
64. Id. arts. 2009(2)(b), 2010(1), 32 I.L.M. at 695-96. Additional provisions prescribe the
selection of panelists based on objectivity, reliability, and sound judgment, id. art. 2009(2)(a),
32 I.L.M. at 695, mandate panelist compliance with the code of conduct established by the
FTC, id. art 2009(2)(c), 32 I.L.M. at 696, provide for the removal of a panelist who violates
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peremptorily challenge panelists not chosen from the roster within
fifteen days of the panelists' nomination.65
Panel proceedings are normally in accordance with Model Rules of
Procedure, 66 which assure certain rights to the Parties.67 Disputants must
provide specific terms of reference within twenty days after the request
for a panel has been made;68 apparently, this is the only, way to plead
nullification or impairment.69 The panel uses standard terms of reference
where the parties fail to provide their own. 70 It may, subject to the terms
agreed upon by the disputants, seek input from experts or scientific
review boards, either on its own or at the request of a disputant.7'
the code of conduct, id. art. 2011(4), 32 I.L.M. at 696, and disqualify individuals as panelists
for any dispute in which they have participated pursuant to art. 2007(5), id. at 2010(2), 32
I.L.M. at 696.
The roster members must.also be willing to serve as panelists. Id. art. 2009(1), 32 I.L.M.
at 695.
65. Id. art. 2011(3), 32 I.L.M. at 696.
66. Id., art. 2012(2), 32 l.L.M.-at 696. However, the Parties may agree otherwise. See id.
The FTC must establish the Model Rules of Procedure. See id. art. 2012(1), 32 I.L.M. at 696.
67. These rights are: at least one hearing before the panel; the opportunity to provide
initial and rebuttal written submissions; confidentiality of all written submissions to the panel;
and confidentiality of the panel's hearings, deliberations, and initial written report. Id. art.
2012(l)(a)-(b), 32 I.L.M. at 696.
68. Id. art. 2012(3), 32 I.L.M. at 696.
69. Compare id. art. 2012(3), 32 I.L.M. at 696 (setting limit for modifying standard
terms of reference, which do not mention nullification or impairment) with id. art. 2013(4),
32 I.L.M. at 696 (requiring terms of reference to specify nullification or impairment as a
cause of action).
70. The standard terms of reference call for an examination of the matter in light of
relevant NAFTA articles, followed by panel findings, determinations, and recommendations.
Id. art. 2012(3), 32 I.L.M. at 696; see also id. art. 2012(5), 32 I.L.M. at 696 (requiring terms
of reference to specify if panel is to make finding of the degree of harm caused by an unac-
ceptable measure).
71. See id. arts. 2014-15, 32 I.L.M. at 696-97 (Role of Experts and Scientific Review
Boards). Interestingly, the Parties placed tight controls on the use of scientific review boards.
Disputing Parties may quash a panel request for a scientific review board, id. art. 2015(I), 32
I.L.M. at 696. The board is selected in consultation with disputants and scientific bodies set
out in the Model Rules of Procedure, id. art. 2015(2), 32 I.L.M. at 697. Participating Parties
must be provided advance notice of, and opportunity to comment on, issues to be referred to
the board. Id. art. 2015(3)(a), 32 1.L.M. at 697. Participants must also have an opportunity to
comment on the board's report and the scope of a board's inquiry is limited to "any factual
issue concerning environmental, health, safety or other scientific matters raised by a disputing
Party in a proceeding." Id. art. 2015(1), 32 I.L.M. at 697. However, if a scientific board is
convened, the panel is required to take its report, and any Party comments on the report, into
account. Id. art. 2015(4), 32 I.L.M. at 697. Cf. id. art. 1133, 32 I.L.M. at 696 (enabling
Parties to disapprove and set terms for use of experts to resolve factual scientific, environ-
mental, health, or safety matters in the special investment DRM).
Evidently, the Parties wish to control any environmentally-related dispute. For related
discussion see infra part .A.I.a.iii.
The panel must also accept input from a non-disputing Party which so requests. NAFTA,
supra note I, art. 2013, 32 I.L.M. at 696. The non-disputant is also entitled to attend all hear-
ings and to receive written submissions of the disputants. See id.
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A panel has ninety days after selection of the final panelist to issue
an initial report,72 which includes findings of fact, determination of
whether the measure is inconsistent with NAFTA or is consistent but
causes nullification or impairment, 73 and any recommendations for
resolution of the matter.74 Disputants have fourteen days to comment in
writing on the initial report.75
Within thirty days after the initial report,. the panel presents a final
report to the disputants, presumably with contents similar to the initial
report.76 The disputants must forward the final report to the FTC within
a reasonable time, complete with any written comments a disputant
wishes to add and any scientific review report.77 The final report is
confidential unless published by the FTC, which will normally occur
fifteen days after receipt by the FTC.78
Upon receipt of the final report, the disputants are expected to
resolve the disagreement. 79 The resolution should conform to any recom-
mendation of the panel 8° and should, wherever possible, constitute the
abrogation or non-implementation of the measures at issue; otherwise,
the Complainant is compensated.81. If the measure at issue is determined
to be unacceptable, and the disputants fail to reach an agreement thirty
days after receiving the final report, the Complainant may suspend
72. Id. art. 2016(2), 32 I.L.M. at 697. The Parties may modify this time limit. See id.
73. Throughout the remainder of this subsection, measures meeting this definition under
CUSFTA or NAFTA shall be referred to as "unacceptable measures."
74. NAFTA, supra note I, art. 2016(2), '32 I.L.M. at 697. See also, id. art. 2016(3), 32
I.L.M. at 697 (allowing dissenting panelists to furnish separate opinions). The report is
normally based only on material submitted during the investigation by the Parties, or from
requested expert or scientific review. Id. art. 2016(1), 32 I.L.M. at 697. However, the Parties
may otherwise agree. See id.
75. Id. art. 2016(4), 32 I.L.M. at 697. If such comments are submitted, the panel may
take further action on its initial report. See id. art. 2016(5), 32 I.L.M. at 697 (giving panel, in
the event of comments on the initial report, discretion to request views of any participant,
reconsider its report, or make appropriate further examination).
76. See id. art. 2017(1), 32 I.L.M. at. 697 (mandating 30 day limit, unless Parties agree
otherwise, but not specifying relationship between contents of initial and final reports). The
final report includes separate opinions. Id. Additionally, no panel report may reveal which
panelists issued majority and minority opinions. Id. art. 2017(2), 32 I.L.M. at 697.
77. Id. art. 2017(3), 32 I.L.M. at 697. The mandatory inclusion of scientific review
reports is further evidence of the Parties' concern over controlling input into environment and
health related disputes. For related discussion see infra part ll.A.l.a.iii.
78. Compare NAFTA, supra note' I, art. 2017(3), 32 I.L.M. at 697 (final report for-
warded to FTC on a confidential basis) with art. 2017(4), 32 i.L.M. at 697 (final report
presumptively published 15 days after receipt by FTC).
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NAFTA benefits "of equivalent effect" until an agreement is reached.82
The Complainant should attempt to suspend these benefits in the same
trade sector or sectors affected by the measure at issue 83 unless this is
not practicable or effective.84 Any disputant may request a panel to
review whether the suspension of benefits is "manifestly excessive."85
However, there is no mention of what, if any, remedial action is re-
quired nor is there mention of when the retaliatory suspension should be
stopped. Presumably, any remedial action must be modified, if it is
"manifestly excessive," and remedial suspension stops if an agreement is
reached.
b. CUSFTA
The general dispute resolution procedure of CUSFTA largely paral-
lels that of NAFTA. However, it is less complex and has some notewor-
thy differences. The comparative simplicity and many differences exist
largely because NAFTA has three members, while CUSFTA has only
two.
In addition to the GATT-or-NAFTA choice discussed in Part
I.A.2.a, CUSFTA also requires Party consultations, with a view to
dispute resolution. 6 If no agreement is reached within thirty days, either
disputant may request a meeting of the CTC, which must convene
within ten days. 87 The CTC will try to facilitate a settlement88 and has
discretion to use technical advisers or a mediator.8 9 After thirty days of
fruitless CTC effort, one of two additional dispute fora may be used:
arbitration9° or an expert panel.9'
The CUSFTA expert panel procedure closely resembles the NAFTA
82. Id. art. 2019(I), 32 I.L.M. at 697.
83. Id. art. 2019(2)(a), 32 I.L.M. at 697.
84. Id. art. 2019(2)(b), 32 I.L.M. at 697.
85. Id. art. 2019(3), 32 I.L.M. at 697; see also id. art. 2019(4), 32 I.L.M. at 698 (provi-
ding that an art. 2019(3) review panel will proceed under the Model Rules of Procedure, and
establishing 60 day review limit).
86. CUSFTA, supra note 6, art. 1804(2), 27 I.L.M. at 384. As in NAFTA, exchanged
confidential information is protected. See id. art. 1804(3), 27 I.L.M. at 384.
87. Id. art. 1805(i), 27 I.L.M. at 384.
88. Id.
89. However, any mediator must be acceptable to both sides. Id. art. 1805(2), 27 I.L.M.
at 384.
90. See id. art. 1806(l)(b), 27 I.L.M. at 384-85 (providing option of arbitration after 30
days).
91. See id. art. 1807(2), 27 I.L.M. at 384-85 (providing option of expert panel after 30
days if arbitration is not used; this time limit may be extended by the CTC).
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arbitral panel process and may only be used if arbitration is not used.92
A panel must be appointed within thirty days of a request,93 and panel-
ists are normally chosen from a roster maintained by the CTC.94 Roster
members must be independent of Party influence but need not have any
general expertise in law or trade.95 A panel consists of five members,
two from each Party and a chair from any country.96 Unlike NAFTA,
there is no CUSFTA prohibition against choosing a party's own citi-
zens. 97 There is also no provision for peremptory challenges under
CUSFTA 98 or for the creation of Model Rules of Procedure.99 However,
CUSFTA panels are required to provide virtually the same substantive
and procedural rights as a NAFTA panel.' o CUSFTA does not explicitly
mention terms of reference but provides them by requiring the panel to
consider the matter and submit a report containing findings, determina-
tion of a measure's unacceptability, and any recommendations for
resolution.' O' In contrast to NAFTA, under CUSFTA, a Party need not
specifically plead nullification and impairment.' °2
While a CUSFTA panel must submit an initial report to the Parties
92. See id.
93. See id. art. 1807(2)-(3), 27 I.L.M. at 385.
94. Id. art. 1807(1), 27 I.L.M. at 385.
95. See id. There is a weak requirement that panelists have expertise in a particular
matter under consideration, where appropriate. See id. Moreover, as in NAFTA, panelists
have "soft" qualifications of "objectivity, reliability and sound judgment." Panelists must also
be willing to serve. Id.
96. Id. art. 1807(3), 27 I.L.M. at 385.
97. Compare id. with NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2011(l)-(2), 32 I.L.M. at 696 and
supra text accompanying note 60. Another difference is that CUSFTA panelists are chosen by
consensus or by lot, where under NAFTA, only the chair is chosen by consensus. Compare
CUSFTA, supra note 6, art. 1807(3), 27 I.L.M. at 385 with NAFTA, supra note 1, art.
2011(l)-(2), 32 I.L.M. at 385 and supra text accompanying note 60.
98. Cf NAFrA, supra note 1, art. 2011(3), 32 I.L.M. at 696 (allowing peremptory
challenges under NAFTA).
99. Cf. id. art. 2012(1), 32 I.L.M. at 696, and text accompanying note 66. Evidently,
each CUSFTA panel will be left to its own devices. CUSFTA, supra note 6, art. 1807(4), 27
I.L.M. at 385. However, the CTC does have discretion to establish rules for a panel. See id.
100. These rights include confidentiality, at least one hearing, and the opportunity to
provide written submissions and rebuttal arguments. See CUSFTA, supra note 6, art. 1807(4).
There are minor differences in the specific enumeration confidentiality rights; the author
regards them as largely inconsequential. Compare id: with NAFTA, supra note 1, art.
2012(1)(b), 32 1.L.M. at 696. But see infra part II.B.3 (discussing problems of non-integra-
tion).
101. See CUSFTA, supra note 6, arts. 1807(2), 27 I.L.M. at 385 (requiring panel to
consider matters referred to it and delimiting contents of report).
102. See id. art. 1807(5), 27 I.L.M. at 385. As in NAFTA, a disputant must request
determination of adverse affect. Compare id. with NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2012(5), 32
I.L.M. at 696.
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within three months of impanelment,10 3 it must normally first give the
Parties a chance to comment on the findings of fact."°4 The CUSFTA
panel procedure requires comment, further deliberation, and final report
periods which are virtually identical to NAFTA.' O5 The CUSFTA also
provides similar, though less explicit, report confidentiality." ° The final
report is sent directly to the CTC,' °7 which must agree upon a resolution
similar to that required under NAFTA. °8 The CTC has thirty days to
resolve the matter, or the Complainant may suspend CUSFTA benefits
of equivalent effect until an agreement has been reached, but only if it
feels its fundamental CUSFTA interests have been harmed.' °9 There is
no mention of review for excessiveness or sectoral limitations on retalia-
tory suspension."o
As an alternative, to the expert panel process, the Parties may refer
any other CUSFTA dispute to binding arbitration on such terms as the
Parties agree."' Arbitration must commence after thirty days of unsuc-
cessful CTC mediation in the case of an emergency action dispute;
otherwise, arbitration may commence after thirty days."12 Arbitration
panels are formed and conducted in accordance to procedures similar to
those which apply to expert panels. 1 3 The Parties can implement the
panel's findings or agree upon some other resolution "in a timely fash-
103. CUSFTA, supra note 6, art. 1807(5), 27 I.L.M. at 385. Cf NAFTA, supra note 1,
art. 2016(2), 32 I.L.M. at 697 (NAFTA panel has 90 days). However, the Parties may change
this deadline. CUSFTA, supra note 6, art. 1807(5), 27 I.L.M. at 385.
104. CUSFTA, supra note 6, art. 1807(5), 27 I.L.M. at 385.
105. Compare id. art. 1807(6), 27 I.L.M. at 385 with NAFTA, supra note 1, arts.
2016(4)-(5), 2017(1), 32 1.L.M. at 697. Also, as in NAFTA, dissenting opinions are allowed,
and Parties may append views to the final report. CUSFTA, supra note 6, arts. 1807(5)-(7),
27 I.L.M. at 385 (allowing dissenting opinions and views of the Parties to be attached to final
report).
106. Compare CUSFTA, supra note 6, arts. 1807(4), (7), 27 I.L.M. at 385 (providing
confidential panel proceedings and allowing CTC to publish the final report) with NAFTA,
supra note I, art. 2012(1)(b), 32 I.L.M. at 696.
107. This distinction from NAFTA is not significant because the Parties and the CTC
will represent the same nations. Not so under NAFTA, where a non-disputant very well may
be on the FTC and sending the report directly to the FTC would therefore be inappropriate.
108. See CUSFTA, supra note 6, art. 1807(8), 27 I.L.M. at 385-86 (requiring resolution
upon receipt; preferring resolution by abrogation or non-implementation of unacceptable
measure; and allowing compensation instead).
109. Id. art. 1807(9), 27 I.L.M. at 386.
110. Cf NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2019(3), 32 I.L.M. at 696 (allowing such review
under NAFTA).
I 1. CUSFTA, supra note 6, art. 1806(l)(b), 27 I.L.M. at 384.
112. Id. art. 1806(1), 27 I.L.M. at 384.
113. Id. art. 1806(2), 27 I.L.M. at 384. However, there is no explicit time limit on when
arbitration panels must produce a report. Id. art. 1807(1), (3)-(4), 27 I.L.M. at 384 (providing
no explicit time limit).
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ion;" otherwise, the Complainant has the option of suspending equiva-
lent CUSFTA benefits."1
4
B. AD/CVD Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
The second element of the NAFTA and CUSFTA dispute resolution
structures is the AD/CVD binational panel system. Although dispute
resolution in general is important to all trade agreements, and to
CUSFTA and NAFTA in particular," 5 the importance of an effective
AD/CVD dispute resolution system to all signatories of both trade pacts
can hardly be overemphasized. Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. interests
each perceive the AD/CVD enforcement actions of the others more as
trade protectionism than as a legitimate exercise of regulatory power."1
6
The AD/CVD DRMs of NAFTA and CUSFTA were designed to ad-
114. Id. art. 1806(3), 27 I.L.M. at 385.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 8-12.
116. See, e.g., Anderson & Fried, supra note 14, at 405-407 (tracing U.S.-Canadian
AD/CVD problems throughout the 1980s); Feldman, supra note 3, at 562-64, 574 (discussing
Canadian concerns over "frivolous" U.S. CVD/AD claims and noting Mexican concerns over
U.S. AD/CVD law); Kevin C. Kennedy, Binational Dispute Settlement Under the Canada-
U.S. Free Trade Agreement, 13 MD. J INT'L L & TRADE 71, 72 (1988) (noting that U.S.-
Canadian friction caused AD/CVD actions, and cataloging U.S. actions from 1980-1985);
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Binational Dispute Settlement Under Chapter 19 of the Canada-
United States Free Trade Agreement: An Interim Appraisal, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
269, 270 (1991) (describing the Canadian view of U.S. AD/CVD law as "contingent protec-
tionism," and contrasting U.S. view of its own law as "defense against unfair trade"); McDor-
man, supra note 12, at 318-19 (characterizing Canadian fears of U.S. CVD actions as
especially strong because of possible targeting of Canadian regional development and social
welfare programs); John A. Ragosta, Natural Resource Subsides and the Free Trade Agree-
ment: Economic Justice and The Need for Subsidy Discipline, 24 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. &
ECON. 255, 255-56 (1990) (Canadian and U.S. CVD actions both criticized). See generally,
Rugman, supra note 12, (providing in-depth discussion of Canadian complaints over U.S.
AD/CVD laws and how CUSFTA dispute resolution is to alleviate perceived abuse); Smith &
Whitney, supra note 12, at 569, 587 (both Mexico and Canada view U.S. AD/CVD law as
"administered protectionism"); Peter Huston, Note, Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
Dispute Settlement Under the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement: Is the Process
Constitutional?, 23 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 529, 532 n.21 (1990) (describing Canadian percep-
tions that U.S. administration of AD/CVD laws is protectionist, and noting Canadians'
economic concerns in the face of perceived increases in U.S. protectionism); Murphy, supra
note 14, at 590 (noting Canadian perception of politically driven AD/CVD determinations and
crediting softwood lumber cases of '83 and '86 as leading to special CUSFTA AD/CVD
provisions); Brendan Hudson, The Background for NAFTA Dispute Resolution, Bus. MEX.,
Nov. 1991, at 40, 42 (noting Mexican worries about "frequent" U.S. CVD actions against
Mexico and Mexican development of, and willingness to use, its own AD/CVD laws);
Clearly, given the plethora of literature on the matter, AD/CVD laws are a matter of concern.
But see infra text accompanying note 318 (suggesting that AD/CVD mechanism are not
intrinsically protectionist, just the convenient weapon of the day).
In terms of WHFTA's relation to AD/CVD concerns, see Abugattas, supra note 17, at
369 (describing general Latin American belief that AD/CVD measures are "a new type of
protectionism.").
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dress these concerns and have enjoyed general high regard," 7 despite
some skepticism" 8 and their curious pedigree." 9
NAFTA AD/CVD dispute resolution is governed by NAFTA Chap-
ter 19.120 CUSFTA's equivalent is CUSFTA Chapter 19.12' The
117. See, e.g., Anderson & Fried, supra note 14, at 410 (noting that CUSFTA AD/CVD
panel reviews have largely worked well to date, have not split along national lines as feared,
have usually been unanimous, and have been thoughtful, well analyzed, and perhaps better
quality than judicial review); Fried, supra note 7, at 235 (stating that CUSFTA AD/CVD
DRM causes objective, transparent administration of trade laws, and should have a dis-
ciplinary effect on national investigating authorities); Gary N. Horlick, The US-Canada FTA
and GATT Dispute Settlement Procedures. The Litigant's View, J. WORLD TRADE, April 1992
at 5, 10-11 (contrasting CUSFTA AD/CVD DRM favorably to the disappointing effect of
CUSFTA general DRM and emphasizing that its success is due to the use of experts on the
panels, and the fact that the panels are driven by private parties); Kennedy, supra note 116, at
104 (advocating use of CUSFTA's AD/CVD DRM as a model for GATT); Lowenfeld, supra
note 116, at 272, 334-35 (describing CUSFTA's AD/CVD DRM as "a clear success" with
regard to efficiency); (characterizing CUSFTA AD/CVD panels as working "extraordinarily
well" overall; producing thorough, articulate and persuasive decisions; being considerably
quicker than alternatives; and being strong on due process); Rugman, supra note 12, at
321-23 (cataloging the benefits of CUSFTA AD/CVD DRM: speed; deterrence of frivolous
U.S. actions; increased perception of fairness and impartiality in administration of unfair trade
laws; and increased access to system by smaller businesses, who could not afford lengthy
judicial review); Smith & Whitney, supra note 12, at 585-86 (CUSFTA AD/CVD procedures
provide impartial, binding, and rapid rule-adjudication); Penny L. Turner, Note, The Feasibili-
ty of a United States-Japan Free Trade Agreement, 26 TEx. INT'L L.J. 275, 291-92 (1991)(suggesting use of CUSFTA AD/CVD DRM as the model for a United States-Japan Free
Trade Agreement DRM).
The idea of a United States-Japan Free Trade Agreement is not as obscure as one might
at first believe. See Fried, supra note 7, at 235 (mentioning call by Sen. Max Baucus
(D-Mont.) for a bilateral United States-Japan trade agreement).
118. See David P. Cluchy, Dispute Resolution Provisions of the Canada-United States
Free Trade Agreement, 40 ME. L. REV. 335 (1988). Cluchy states that: "[lI]t is difficult to
conclude that a binational panel will reach a different result from that which the Court of
International Trade or the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit would reach in reviewing
determinations of the International Trade Commission and the Commerce Department under
United States trade laws." Id. at 347. See also McDorman, supra note 12, at 322 (characteri-
zing final review determinations as "a leap of faith in third-party dispute settlement" and
questioning the effectiveness of AD/CVD statutory review); Murphy, supra note 14, at
595-96 (claiming underlying academic and professional dissatisfaction with AD/CVD panel
procedures); Carlsen, supra note 12, at 320 (expressing doubt that Canada will be satisfied
with CUSFTA's AD/CVD binational panel decisions because review is not on substantive
grounds, but on the correct application of substantive laws).
119. The CUSFTA AD/CVD binational panel system was evidently a hastily-drafted,
eleventh-hour proposal, which was only necessary because U.S. and Canadian negotiators
could not reach an agreement on harmonizing underlying dumping and subsidies laws. See
Anderson & Fried, supra note 14, at 408 (claiming that binational panel provisions were
negotiated Oct. 1-3, 1988, under the deadline of fast-track expiration); Lowenfeld, supra note
116, at 270-71 (describing panel process as a procedural solution, which resulted from
inability to resolve substantive AD/CVD differences); Murphy, supra note 14, at 589-91
(characterizing binational panel procedures as a product of the fast-track expiration deadline
and the failure to produce an agreement on subsidies in time to meet it; crediting Rep. Sam
M. Gibbons (Democrat-N.D.), Chairman of the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on
Trade, with tabling the binational panel procedures).
120. NAFTA, supra note I, ch.. 19, 32 I.L.M. at 682-93 (Review and Dispute Settlement
in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Matters).
121. CUSFTA, supra note 6, ch. 19, 27 I.L.M. at 386-95. (Binational Panel Dispute
Settlement in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases).
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CUSFTA and NAFTA binational panel systems are almost identical;
consequently, this discussion applies to both structures. The few techni-
cal differences are mentioned in the footnotes; the two important ones
are discussed infra Part B.2.d.
As a final introductory matter, the Parties under both NAFTA and
CUSFTA reserve their right to apply national AD/CVD law to the goods
of the other Parties. 22 Moreover, each Party retains the power to modify
its AD/CVD laws, subject to certain restrictions. 23
1. AD/CVD Dispute Resolution Institutional Provisions
The. Secretariat is a permanent body which facilitates the resolution
of AD/CVD disputes. 24 It has national sections 25 with permanent of-
fices, 26 each managed by a national Secretary.127 The Secretaries jointly
provide administrative assistance to AD/CVD dispute resolution panels
and committees. 128 The AD/CVD DRM also has the following im-
122. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1902(1), 32 I.L.M. at 682; CUSFTA, supra note 6, art.
1902(1), 27 I.L.M. at 386. "Law" includes relevant statutes, legislative history, regulations,
administrative practice, and judicial precedents. Id.
123. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1902(2), 32 I.L.M. at 682; CUSFTA, supra note 6, art.
1902(2), 27 I.L.M. at 386-87. The restrictions are that amendments only apply to other
Parties if the amending statute so specifies that the amending Party should notify the other
Parties as far in advance of enactment as possible, that the amending Party consults with
affected Parties on demand, and that such amendment is not inconsistent with GATT, the
GATT Subsidies and Antidumping Codes, and the objects and purposes of NAFTA or
CUSFTA, as appropriate. See id.
Anticipating the completion of the Uruguay negotiations, the NAFTA drafters added a
phrase which provides that amendments must be consistent with any successor agreements to
the GATT and its two listed codes. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1902(2)(d)(i), 32 I.L.M. at
682.
124. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1908, 32 I.L.M. at 686 (directing establishment of
sections within the Secretariat, created under NAFTA, to facilitate operation of the AD/CVD
dispute chapter; and directing the Secretariat to support all AD/CVD dispute resolution panels
and committees); CUSFTA, supra note 6, art. 1909, 27 I.L.M. at 391 (establishing a Secretar-
iat to facilitate operation of the AD/CVD dispute chapter and directing the Secretariat to
support all AD/CVD dispute resolution panels and committees).
125. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2002(1), 32 I.L.M. at 693 (providing explicitly for
national sections); CUSFTA, supra note 6, art. 1909(2)-(3), 27 I.L.M. at 391 (providing
implicitly for national sections).
126. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2002(2)(a), 32 I.L.M. at 693; CUSFTA, supra note 6,
art. 1909(2), 27 I.L.M. at 391.
127. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2002(2)(c), 32 I.L.M. at 693; CUSFTA, supra note 6,
art. 1909(4)-(5), 27 I.L.M. at 391.
128. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1908(2), 32 I.L.M. at 686; CUSFTA, supra note 6, art.
1909(8), 27 I.L.M. at 391.
However, the Secretary for the Party which hosts a dispute resolution proceeding
prepares the official record for those proceedings. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1908(2), 32
I.L.M. at 686; CUSFTA, supra note 6, art. 1909(8), 27 I.L.M. at 391. Furthermore, the
Secretaries of the Secretariat must freely exchange relevant AD/CVD dispute information.
NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1908(2)-(4), 32 I.L.M. at 686; CUSFTA, supra note 6, art.
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permanent elements: the binational panel, the extraordinary challenge
committee, and the special committee.129
2. AD/CVD Procedural Provisions
There are four distinct procedures in the AD/CVD provisions:
Statutory Amendment Review, 30 Review of Final AD and CVD
Determinations, 31 Consultations, 3 and Special Committee Review.'
33
a. Statutory Amendment Review
Any affected Party may request review of an AD or CVD statutory
amendment, on the grounds that (1) it is inconsistent with GATT, the GATT
Dumping or Subsidies Codes, or the object and purpose of NAFTA or
CUSFTA; 134 or (2) has the "function and effect" of overturning the prior
decision of an AD/CVD Final Determination Review Panel. 35 The Parties
will establish a Statutory Amendment Review Panel no later than fifty-five
to sixty-one days after the panel request. 36 Panelists are normally chosen
from a roster- (established by the Parties) of at least seventy-five 37
1909(10), 27 I.L.M. at 391.
129. The special challenge committee is the substantive difference between CUSFTA and
NAFTA. See infra part 1.B.2.d.
130. NAFMA, supra note 1, art. 1903, 32 I.L.M. at 682; CUSFrA, supra note 6, art.
1903, 27 I.L.M. at 387.
131. NAFTA, supra note I, art. 1904, 32 I.L.M. at 683; CUSFTA, supra note 6, art.
1904, 27 I.L.M. at 387.
132. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1907, 32 I.L.M. at 685-86; CUSFrA, supra note 6, art.
1908, 27 I.L.M. at 390.
133. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1905, 32 I.L.M. at 684-85; note that this is the substan-
tive difference between NAFTA and CUSFTA AC/CVD DRMs. See infra part I.B.2.d. -
134. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1903(I)(a), 32 1.L.M. at 682; CUSFTA, supra note 6, art.
1903(l)(a), 27 I.L.M. at 387.
135. NAFrA, supra note 1, art. 1903(1)(b), 32 I.L.M. at 682; CUSFTA, supra note 6, art.
1903(l)(b), 27 I.L.M. at 387.
136. The timeline varies, depending on how cooperative the Parties are. See NAFTA, supra
note 1, annex 1901.2, 32 I.L.M. at 687; id. art. 1901(2), 32 I.L.M. at 682; CUSFT7A, supra note
6, annex 1901.2, 27 I.L.M. at 393; id. art. 1901(2), 27 I.L.M. at 386. Specifically, the disputing
Parties in consultation each must appoint two panelists within 30 days of the panel request. Each
Party then has until day 45 to exercise up to four peremptory challenges, and to replace any
of its panelists who are peremptorily challenged. See NAFrA, supra note I, annex 1901.2(2),
32 I.L.M. at 687; CUSFTA, supra note 6, annex 1901.2(2), 27 I.L.M. at 393. If a Party does
not meet these deadlines, its missing panelists will be appointed by lot. Id. Within 55 days of
the panel request, the Parties choose the fifth panelist. If this deadline is missed, one Party is
chosen by lot to appoint, the fifth panelist from the roster, discussed infra notes 137-39 and
accompanying text, by the 61st day excluding candidates who were peremptorily challenged.
137. CUSFTA provides for at least 50 roster members. See CUSFrA, supra note 6, annex
1901.2(1), 27 I.L.M. at 393.
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individuals; 38 the majority of panelists must be lawyers in good standing. 139
After impanelment, a chairman is selected by vote or by lot from the
lawyers on the panel. 14 Panelists must guarantee they will safeguard
confidential information divulged to them during panel proceedings.''
Moreover, a panelist may not appear as counsel before another panel
while serving as a panelist. 42 Finally, panelists are immune from all
legal action for official acts, except violations of confidential
guarantees. 143
Panel proceedings are confidential and conducted according to rules
of procedure established by the panelists.'" Within ninety days of
selecting a chairman, the panel issues an initial written opinion on
whether-the relevant amendment is unacceptable.145 If the amendment is
138. NAFTA, supra note 1, annex 1901.2(1), 32 I.L.M. at 687; CUSFTA, supra note 6,
Annex 1901.2(1), 27 I.L.M. at 393. Each Party selects at least 25 roster members, in consultation
with the others. All candidates must be citizens of the Parties of good character, high standing
and repute; be independent of Party influence; and shall be chosen for objectivity, reliability,
sound judgment, and general familiarity with international trade law. Id. If the panelists are not
chosen from the roster, they still must meet these qualifications. See NAFTA, supra note 1, annex
1901.2(2), 32 I.L.M. at 687; CUSFTA, supra note 6, annex 1901.2(2), 27 I.L.M. at 393.
Additionally, NAFTA mandates that "[t]he roster shall include judges or former judges to the
fullest extent practicable." NAFTA, supra note 1, annex 1901.2(1), 32 I.L.M. at 687.
139. NAFTA, supra note 1, annex 1901.2(2), 32 I.L.M. at 687; CUSFTA, supra note 6,
annex 1901.2(2), 27 I.L.M. at 393. Moreover, panelists will be subject to a code of conduct
established by the Parties pursuant to NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1909, 32 I.L.M. at 686, or
CUSFI'A, supra note 6, art. 1910, 27 I.L.M. at 391, respectively.. A panelist who violates the
code will be replaced. See NAFTA, supra note 1, annex 1901.2(6), 32 I.L.M. at 687; CUSFTA,
supra'note 6, art. 1901.2(6), 27 I.L.M. at 393.
140. NAFrA, supra note 1, annex 1901.2(4), 32 I.L.M. at 687; CUSFTA, supra note 6,
annex 1901.2(4), 27 I.L.M. at 393.
141. NAFTA, supra note 1, annex 1901.2(7)-(8), 32 I.L.M. at 688. Failure to sign an
agreement to this effect will disqualify a panelist. Further, the Parties must establish sanctions
for violation of the protective agreements. Id.
142. Id. annex 1901.2(11), 32 I.L.M. at 688; CUSFTA, supra note 6, annex 1901.2(1 1),
27 I.L.M. at 394. Otherwise, the only restrictions on outside business activities are that they
not interfere with performance of panel duties and are in keeping with the code of conduct.
See NAFTA, supra note 1, annex 1901.2(10), 32 I.L.M. at 688; CUSFTA, supra note 6,
annex 1901.2(10), 27 I.L.M. at 394.
143. NAFTA, supra note 1, annex 1901.2(12), 32 1.L.M. at 688; CUSFTA, supra note 6,
annex 1901.2(12), 27 I.L.M. at 394.
144. NAFTA, supra note 1, annex 1903.2(1), 32 I.L.M. at 688; CUSFTA, supra note 6,
annex 1903.2(1), 27 I.L.M. at 394. The Parties may agree not to keep the proceedings con-
fidential. Also, they may agree on other rules of procedure prior to panel establishment. In
any event, the rules of procedure shall guarantee at least-one hearing before the panel and the
right to present written submissions and rebuttal arguments. Panel decisions will be based on
the Parties' arguments and submissions. Id.
145. NAFTA, supra note 1, annex 1903.2(2), 32 I.L.M. at 688; CUSFTA, supra note 6,
annex 1903.2(2), 27 I.L.M. at 394. The initial opinion must contain findings of fact, as well
as the decision on unacceptability, and the disputing Parties may agree to modify the 90 day
limit. Id. For purposes of this subsection, an "unacceptable" amendment is one that violates
GATT, the relevant GATT codes, or the object and purpose of NAFTA or CUSFTA, respec-
tively. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
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unacceptable, the initial opinion may include recommendations to make
it acceptable.' 46 The disputants have fourteen days to object to the initial
decision; otherwise it becomes the final opinion.'47 If an objection is
made, the panel must request the views of both disputants and recon-
sider its initial opinion.'48 Within thirty days of any objection, and after
appropriate further examination, the panel issues its final opinion. 49 The
final opinion is made public, unless the disputants otherwise agree. 50
If the panel recommends modification to an unacceptable statute, the
disputants have ninety days from the final decision to reach a resolu-
tion.' 51 If no corrective legislation is enacted within nine months of the
ninety day consultation period and no other solution is reached, the
Complainant Party may take equivalent, retaliatory action or terminate
the FTA with the Respondent upon sixty days written notice.'
52
b. Review of Final AD or CVD Determinations
This type of AD/CVD DRM is designed to replace judicial review
of final AD or CVD administrative determinations. 53 It may be invoked
by an involved Party on its own initiative and must be invoked by a
Party at the request of a Party's national who has the right to commence
domestic judicial review of the final determination.'54 Any request for
binational panel review must be made within thirty days after a par-
ticipant has reason to know of a final determination by a competent
Dissenting panelists may provide separate opinions on matters upon which they did not
agree. NAFTA, supra note 1, annex 1903.2(3), 32 I.L.M. at 688; CUSFTA, supra note 6,
annex 1903.2(3), 27 I.L.M. at 394.
146. NAFTA, supra note I, annex 1903.2(3), 32 I.L.M. at 688; CUSFTA, supra note 6,
annex 1903.2(3), 27 I.L.M. at 394.
147. NAFTA, supra note 1, annex 1903.2(3)-(4), 32 I.L.M. at 688; CUSFTA, supra note
6, annex 1903.2(3)-(4), 27 I.L.M. at 394.
148. NAFMA, supra note 1, annex 1903.2(4), 32 I.L.M. at 688; CUSFTA, supra note 6,
annex 1903.2(4), 27 I.L.M. at 394.
149. NAFTA, supra note I, annex 1903.2(4), 32 I.L.M. at 688; CUSFTA, supra note 6,
annex 1903.2(4), 27 I.L.M. at 394. The final opinion includes separate opinions of any
panelist. Id.
150. NAFrA, supra note 1, annex 1903.2(5), 32 I.L.M. at 688; CUSFTA, supra note 6,
annex 1903.2(5), 27 1.L.M. at 394. Separate opinions of panelists, and any written views the
Parties wish, shall also be published. Id.
151. NAFTA, supra note I, art. 1903(3)(a), 32 I.L.M. at 682; CUSFTA, supra note 6,
art. 1903(3)(a), 27 I.L.M. at 387.
152. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1903(3)(b), 32 I.L.M. at 682; CUSFTA, supra note 6,
art. 1903(3)(b), 27 I.L.M. at 387.
153. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904(l), 32 I.L.M. at 683; CUSFTA, supra note 6, art.
1904(1), 27 I.L.M. at 387.
154. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904(5), 32 I.L.M. at 683; CUSFTA, supra note 6, art.
1904(5), 27 I.L.M. at 388.
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investigating authority. 155
Resort to this procedure precludes domestic judicial review of the
determination, and Parties may not legislatively provide for an appeal
from a binational panel decision to its domestic courts.15 6 However,
Parties must amend their laws so that (1) procedures for domestic judi-
cial review cannot begin unless the thirty-day panel request period is
over; and (2) the appellant has notified affected Parties or persons of his
intent to seek judicial review no later than day twenty of the panel
request period.'57
The Final Determination Binational Review Panel is formed using
the same roster and timeline as those used for Statutory Amendment
Review. 158 The -Panel reviews a final. AD or CVD determination, based
on the administrative record, to decide if it is consistent with the AD or
CVD law of the importing Party. 59 The Panel applies the law as a court
of the importing Party would in reviewing such a final determination. 
60
Proceedings are in accordance with rules of procedure established by the
155. NAFTA, supra note I, art. 1904(4), 32 I.L.M. at 683; CUSFTA, supra note 6, art.
1904(4), 27 1.L.M. at 388. "Reason to know" means publication of a final determination in
official journal of the importing Party or notification of the affected Party by the importing
Party. See id. "Competent investigating authority" means any of the following or their
successors: the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (the Import Tribunal under CUSFTA),
the Canadian Deputy Minister of National Revenue for Customs and Excise, the U.S. Interna-
tional Trade Administration, the U.S. International Trade Commission, or the designated
authority within the Mexican Secretaria de Comercio y Fomento Industrial. See NAFA,
supra note 1, annex 1911, 32 I.L.M. at 691-93; CUSFTA, supra note 6, art. 1911, 27 I.L.M.
at 391-93.
Additionally, requests for binational panel review of the same final determination by
both involved Parties are consolidated. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904(6), 32 I.L.M. at 683;
CUSFTA, supra note 6, art. 1904(6), 27 I.L.M. at 388.
156. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904(11), 32 I.L.M. at 683; CUSFTA, supra note 6, art.
1904(11), 27 I.L.M. at 388.
157. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904(15)(c), 32 I.L.M. at 684; CUSFrA, supra note 6,
art. 1904(15)(g), 27 I.L.M. at 390. There is also a provision for general amendment of the
Parties' AD and CVD laws so as to achieve the objectives of the final determination review
panel. See generally NAFrA, supra note 1, art. 1904(15), 32 I.L.M. at 684; id. annex
1904.15, 32 I.L.M. at 689; CUSFIA, supra note 6, art. 1904(15), 27 I.L.M. at 389-90 (provi-
ding illustrative list of statutes to be amended). Moreover, the AD/CVD panel procedure
cannot be used where a final determination directly results from the remand of a prior final
determination by a domestic court of the importing Party, where neither involved Party sought
Binational Panel review of the original decision. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904(12)(b), 32
I.L.M. at 683; CUSFTA, supra note 6, art. 1904(12)(b), 27 I.L.M. at 388.
158. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1901(2), 32 I.L.M. at 682; CUSFTA, supra note 6, art.
1901(2), 27 I.L.M. at 386.
159. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904(2), 32 I.L.M. at 683; CUSFTA, supra note 6, art.
1904(2), 32 I.L.M. at 387. For the purposes of making this determination, AD and CVD law
consists of the relevant statutes, legislative history, regulations, administrative practice, and
judicial precedence, to the extent that a court of the importing Party would use them.
160. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904(2), 32 I.L.M. at 683; CUSFTA, supra note 6, art.
1904(2), 27 I.L.M. at 389.
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Parties,' 6' and each participant has a right to appear and be represented
by counsel.' 62 A final determination is due within 315 days of the panel
request. 163 A Final Determination Review Panel may uphold a final
determination or remand it for action consistent with the panel's deci-
sion.16
i. Extraordinary Challenge of Final Determination Review
The final panel decision is binding on the involved Parties with
respect to the matter in dispute. 165 Although a final decision is not
reviewable on substantive grounds, it may be challenged on the grounds
of: (1) gross misconduct, bias, serious conflict of interest, or material
breach of rules of conduct by a panelist;'6 (2) serious departure from a
fundamental rule of procedure by a panel; 67 or (3) a panel manifestly
exceeding its powers, authority, or jurisdiction. 168 In addition, the breach
must materially affect the panel's decision and threaten the integrity of
the binational panel' system.169 In these extreme circumstances, an ex-
traordinary challenge committee convenes170
Within fifteen days of a request, the Parties form an extraordinary
161. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904(6), 32 I.L.M. at 683; CUSFrA, supra note 6, art.
1904(6), 27 1.L.M. at 388. Illustrative guidelines for the contents of the rules of procedure are
provided in NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904(14), 32 I.L.M. at 684, and CUSFTA, supra note
6, art. 1904(14), 27 I.L.M. at 389.
162. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904(7), 32 I.L.M. at 683; CUSFTA, supra note 6, art.
1904(7), 27 I.L.M. at 388. "Participants" include the competent investigating authority whose
decision is being reviewed 'and those persons who had standing to appeal the final determina-
tion to a domestic court.
163. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904(14), 32 I.L.M. at 684; CUSFTA, supra note 6, art.
1904(14), 27 I.L.M. at 389.
164. The remand period shall be as brief as possible and in no event shall exceed the
maximum amount of time the investigating authority had to make the original final determina-
tion. If review of a remand is necessary, the same' panel reviews the remand action and issues
a final decision within 90 days of receiving the remand result. NAFTA, supra note 1, art.
1904(8), 32 I.L.M. at 683; CUSFTA, supra note 6, art. 1904(8), 27 I.L.M. at 388.
165. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904(9), 32 I.L.M. at 683; CUSFrA, supra note 6, art.
1904(9), 27 I.L.M. at 388.
166. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904(13)(a)(i), 32 I.L.M. at 683; CUSFrA, supra note
6, art. 1904(13)(a)(i), 27 I.L.M. at 389.
167. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904(13)(a)(ii), 32 I.L.M. at 683; CUSFTA, supra note
6, art. 1904(13)(a)(ii), 27 I.L.M. at 389.
168. NAFTA, supra note 1, art: 1904(a)(iii), 32 I.L.M. at 683; CUSFTA, supra note 6,
art. 1904(13)(a)(iii), 27 I.L.M. at 389.
169. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904(13)(b), 32 I.L.M. at 683; CUSFTA, supra note 6,
art. 1904(13)(b), 27 I.L.M. at 389.
170. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904(13), 32 I.L.M. at 683; CUSFTA, supra note 6, art.
1904(13), 27 I.L.M. at 388-89.
[Vol. 15:255
NAFTA and Trade Dispute Resolution
challenge committee, 171 composed of three members chosen from a
roster of fifteen'72 judges or former judges. 173 Proceedings conform to
the rules of procedure established by the Parties.'74 The committee will
reach a final decision within thirty (for CUSFTA)'75 or ninety (for
NAFTA) 76 days of its establishment, and the decision binds the in-
volved Parties as to the matter in contention. 177 If the committee deter-
mines that a breach occurred, it remands to the original panel for action
consistent with its decision or vacates the original panel decision, which
causes a new review panel procedure to begin. 78 Otherwise, the chal-
lenge is denied, and the original panel decision is affirmed. 79
c. Consultations
The consultations DRM is the least developed AD/CVD DRM in
both NAFTA and CUSFTA, though NAFTA does elaborate on the idea.
CUSFTA and NAFTA both provide for consultations between desig-
nated Party officials where required to carry out CUSFTA's AD/CVD
chapter.1 80 NAFTA adds requirements for annual Party consultations on
problems relating to the AD/CVD chapter' and annual consultations
171. NAFTA, supra note I, annex 1904.13(l), 32 I.L.M. at 688; CUSFTA, supra note 6,
annex 1904.13(1), 27 I.L.M. at 395. The only time limit on the request for an extraordinary
challenge process is that it be "within a reasonable time after the panel decision is issued."
NAFFA, supra note I, art. 1904(13), 32 I.L.M. at 683; CUSFTA, supra note 6, art. 1904(13),
27 I.L.M. at 388-89.
172. CUSFTA provides for a ten member roster. See CUSIFTA, supra note 6, annex
1904.13(1), 27 I.L.M. at 395.
173. The judges or former judges must be from a U.S. or Mexican federal-level judicial
court or a Canadian judicial court of superior jurisdiction. Each Party names five persons to
the roster. NAFTA, supra note I, annex 1904.13(l), 32 I.L.M. at 688; CUSIFTA, supra note
6, annex 1904.13(1), 27 I.L.M. at 395. Each involved Party selects one committee member
from the roster, and, in NAFTA, the involved parties decide by lot which of them will select
the third member from the roster. NAFTA, supra note i, annex 1904.13(1), 32 I.L.M. at 688.
CUSFTA provides that the two selected committee members choose the third member from
the roster. See CUSFTA, supra note 6, annex 1904.13(l), 27 I.L.M. at 395.
174. The Parties must also establish the rules before the respective dates of entry into
force of the two agreements. NAFTA, supra note I, annex 1904.13(2), 32 I.L.M. at 688;
CUSFTA, supra note 6, annex 1904.13(2), 27 I.L.M. at 395.
175. CUSIFTA, supra note 6, annex 1904.13(2), 27 I.L.M. at 395.
176. NAFTA, supra note 1, annex 1904.13(2), 32 I.L.M. at 688.
177. Id. annex 1904.13(3), 32 I.L.M. at 688; CUSIFTA, supra note 6, annex 1904.13(3),
27 I.L.M. at 395.
178. NAFTA, supra note 1, annex 1904.13(3), 32 I.L.M. at 688; CUSFTA, supra note 6,
annex 1904.13(3), 27 I.L.M. at 395.
179. NAFTA, supra note 1, annex 1904.13(3), 32 I.L.M. at 688; CUSFTA, supra note 6,
annex 1904.13(3), 27 I.L.M. at 395.
180. CUSFTA, supra note 6, art. 1908, 27 I.L.M. at 390.
181. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1907(I), 32 I.L.M. at 685.
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between the investigating authorities."8 2 Finally, NAFTA contains
an agreement to consult on alternative AD/CVD rules and disciplines.8 3
d. Special Committee Review
NAFTA makes two big changes to CUSFTA's AD/CVD dispute
resolution regime. The first is the apparent abandonment of any serious
attempt to harmonize the Parties' AD/CVD laws.'84 The second is the
provision of a special committee process to safeguard the panel review
system. 185
A Party resorts to the special committee review if it believes another
Party's domestic law has interfered with any binational panel process.1
8 6
The Complainant requests consultations on the matter, which begin
within fifteen days.8 7 If the Parties do not resolve the matter in forty-
five days, the Complainant may request a special committee., 8 Within
fifteen days of the request, a special committee is established, 8 9 using
the same roster and selection procedure as does the extraordinary
challenge procedure. 9° Special committee proceedings conform to rules
182. Id. art. 1907(3), 32 I.L.M. at 686. NAFTA also provides an illustrative list of
matters for the investigating authorities to consider. See id.
183. Id. art. 1907(2), 32 I.L.M. at 685.
184. Compare id. arts. 1901(3), 1902, 32.I.L.M. at 682 (providing that no provision of
NAFTA imposes obligations on a Party with respect to its AD or CVD laws) with CUSFTA,
supra note 6, arts. 1906, 1907, 27 I.L.M. at 390 (allowing for a maximum of seven years for
the United States and Canada to harmonize AD/CVD laws, or face possible termination of
CUSFTA and establishing a working group to harmonize the Parties' AD/CVD laws. This
discrepancy could mean that Canada and the United States will continue their harmonization
efforts under CUSFTA, regardless of NAFTA. For a related discussion, see infra part I1.A.2.
But see NAFrA, supra note 1, art. ;1907(2), 32 I.L.M. at 685 (providing a weak requirement
that parties consult to develop more effective rules and disc.plines to govern unfair pricing
and government subsidization, and providing for potential reliance upon a substitute system of
rules on transborder pricing and government subsidization). For further elaboration of this
topic, see infra part II.A.2.
185. NAFTA, supra note I, art. 1905, 32 I.L.M. at 684.
186. Id. art. 1905(1), 32 I.L.M. at 684. Specifically, the provision mentions allegations
that "the application of another Party's domestic law" has: (I) prevented the establishment of
a panel requested by the Complainant; (2) prevented a panel requested by the Complainant
from reaching a final decision; (3) prevented implementation or denied the binding force of a
panel requested by Complainant; or (4) failed to provide for review of final AD/CVD final
administrative determinations by a panel or by an independent domestic court of competent
jurisdiction. See id. Evidently this review applies equally to statutory review panels and final
AD or CVD determination review panels. See infra note 200.
187. NAFrA, supra note I, art. 1905(I), 32 I.L.M. at 684.
188. Id. art. 1905(2), 32 I.L.M. at 684. The consulting Parties may modify this deadline.
See id.
189. Id. art. 1905(3), 32 I.L.M. at 684. The disputing Parties may modify this deadline.
See id.
190. See id. art. 1905(4)-(5), 32 I.L.M. at 684 (mandating the same roster and requiring
the same procedures and number of panelists).
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of procedure provided by the Parties' 9' and are confidential. 92 An initial
report is typically issued sixty days after the committee is formed,
followed by a final report thirty days later. 93 Involved Parties must
comment on the initial report within fourteen days. 194 The final decision
is published ten days after it is issued. 95 A finding of interference by
the Respondent will automatically stay many binational panel or extraor-
dinary challenge committee reviews' 96 and will stop the clock on
requests for panel or committee review. 97
If the special committee determines that a Party's domestic law has
interfered with any panel process, the disputing Parties have sixty days
to consult on a resolution.' "98 A "resolution" may be either an agreement
between disputants or unilateral action by the Respondent that satisfies
the special committee.' 99 If the dispute is not resolved in sixty days, the
Complainant may suspend either operation of final AD/CVD determina-
tion review procedures or any appropriate NAFTA benefits with respect
to the Respondent.
200
If the Complainant suspends thefinal determination provisions, the
191. See id. art. 1905(6), annex 1905.6, 32 l.L.M. at 684, 691. The rules will provide,
inter alia, for the right to at least one hearing before the special committee, as well as the
opportunity to provide initial and rebuttal written submissions. See id. annex 1905.6(a), 32
I.L.M. at 691.
192. Id. annex 1905.6(c), 32 I.L.M. at 691.
193. Id. annex 1905.6(b), 32 I.L.M. at 691.
194. Id.
195. Id. annex 1905.6(d), 32 I.L.M. at 691. However, the Parties may agree otherwise.
Also, the final report includes any separate opinions of panelists and any written views the
disputing Parties wish to attach. Id.
196. Id. art. 1905(1 1)(a), 32 I.L.M. at 685. This article provides an intricate guideline as
to when and how final determination proceedings will be stayed. The scheme operates to the
advantage of the Complainant by leaving a stay of its proceedings within its discretion, and
mandating the stay of the Respondent's proceedings. Automatic stay of proceedings only
applies to actions under NAFTA's final determination review, not to statutory amendment
review. Id.
197. Id. art. 1905(1 1)(b), 32 1.L.M. at 685. The clock will resume if either party sus-
pends final determination review proceedings. Id. art. 1905(12), 32 I.L.M. at 685.
198. Id. art. 1905(7), 32 I.L.M. at 684. Further, the Parties must begin the consultations
within ten days of the report. Id.
199. See id. art. 1905(8), 32 I.L.M. at 684-85 (providing for unilateral action by the
Complainant if the Respondent does not meet either of these requirements). Either Party may
demand that the special committee reconvene and rule on the sufficiency of Respondent's
unilateral action. Id. art. 1905(10)(b), 32 I.L.M. at 685. For time limits and the effects of such
a ruling, see infra notes 203-204 and accompanying text.
200. Id. art. 1905(8), 32 I.L.M. at 684-85. Evidently, suspending the final determination
review provision is retaliation for interference with the final determination review process and
suspending other benefits is retaliation for interference in the statutory amendment process.
However, the text is not clear on this issue.
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Respondent may reciprocate.2"' However, if the Complainant suspends
other appropriate benefits, the Respondent may only appeal to the
special committee on grounds that the suspension is "manifestly ex-
cessive. ''202 The special committee has forty-five days to consider either
the excessiveness of the Complainant's retaliatory benefit suspension or
the sufficiency of any corrective action.20 3 A finding of sufficient action
requires reinstatement of suspended benefits by both Parties.2° Although
the effect of a finding of "manifestly excessive" retaliatory suspension is
not mentioned, presumably there should be some remedial action. If
either Party suspends final determination review proceedings, automati-
cally stayed proceedings2 5 are terminated and irrevocably referred to
domestic courts for review. 2' Any imposed sanctions are presumably
lifted if agreement is reached, but NAFTA is silent on this issue.
C. Special Dispute Resolution Provisions
Both NAFTA and CUSFTA have a network of special dispute
resolution provisions, which are defined as provisions which modify or
substitute for the general and AD/CVD DRMs. NAFTA excludes much
more from the "nullification or impairment" provision than does
CUSFTA. 2 7 Also, NAFTA creates a special DRM for certain invest-
ment-related disputes2 8 and exempts several types of investment dis-
putes altogether. 209 By contrast, CUSFTA only encourages. use of experts
in the general DRM 210 without creating a special mechanism, and it only
excludes one type of investment dispute.21 ' NAFTA excludes competi-
201. Id. art. 1905(9), 32 I.L.M. at 685. If either Party suspends the final determination
review process, it must notify the other in writing. Id.
202. See id. art. 1905(10)(a), 32 I.L.M. at 685 (providing both Parties the right to
demand a ruling on this issue).
203. Id. art. 1905(10), 32 I.L.M. at 685.
204. id.
205. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (describing automatic stay of panel
procedures).
206. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1905(12), 32 I.L.M. at 685. Similar to an automatic stay
of proceedings, the system works to the advantage of the Complainant by leaving termination
of all proceedings largely within its discretion, or in the discretion of private parties to panel
proceedings.
207. Compare NAFMA, supra note I, annex 2004, 32 I.L.M. at 699 with CUSFTA,
supra note 6, art. 2011, 27 I.L.M. at 398 (illustrating the different exemptions in CUSFTA
and NAFTA).
208. NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. I I § B, 32 I.L.M. at 642-47.
209. Id. art. 1138, 32 I.L.M. at 647.
210. CUSFTA, supra note 6, art. 1608(4), 27 I.L.M. at 376.
211. Id. art. 1608(1), 27 I.L.M. at 376.
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tion law from any dispute procedure;2t 2 CUSFTA does not. NAFTA
provides a special DRM for financial services; 213 CUSFTA excludes
them altogether from dispute resolution 214 but provides for Party consul-
tations on matters affecting CUSFTA financial services.15 In case of
actual "escape clause" action, NAFTA provides the less formal DRM of
direct Party consultation to negotiate compensation 21 6 but otherwise
excludes escape clause actions from formal dispute settlement.
217
CUSFTA directs compulsory binding arbitration for disputes over actual
escape clause actions but nevertheless excludes proposed emergency
actions from any formal DRM.2 " Both CUSFTA and NAFTA guarantee
special bid-challenge procedures for disputes over government procure-
ment. 219 CUSFTA also gives either Party the right to refer to arbitration
any dispute over levels of government support for wheat, oats, and
barley.22 ° Finally, both agreements provide a number of provisions 221
allowing or directing consultations in certain circumstances. Mostly,
these provide for various bodies to discuss agreement-related matters. In
NAFTA, these consultations occasionally substitute for formal dispute
resolution, as with escape clause actions discussed above.
II. CRITIQUE OF THE NAFTA DISPUTE RESOLUTION STRUCTURE
This critique of the NAFTA dispute resolution structure is far from
exhaustive. Instead, examination of the system focuses on several dis-
crete issues. These issues are initially divided into matters of commis-
sion (i.e., changes which were made) and matters of omission (i.e.,
changes which should have been made). Tentative suggestions for
solutions to perceived problems are included in each section.
Before critiquing the NAFTA DRM structure, it is important to
reiterate that the CUSFTA system from which NAFTA evolved has
worked very well so far. Even though this critique focuses on perceived
212. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1501(3), 32 I.L.M. at 663.
213. Id. arts. 1414-15, 32 I.L.M. at 660-61.
214. CUSFTA, supra note 6, art. 1801(l), 27 I.L.M. at 383.
215. See id. art. 1704(2), 27 I.L.M. at 382 (providing for consultations between the
Canadian Department of Finance and the U.S. Department of the Treasury).
216. NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 801(4), 802(6), 32 I.L.M. at 383, 384.
217. See id. art. 804, 32 I.L.M. at 384 (precluding the use of arbitral panels for escape
clause actions).
218. CUSFTA, supra note 6, art. 1103, 27 I.L.M. at 352.
219. See id. art. 1305(3), annex 1305.3, 27 I.L.M. at 354, 360; NAFTA, supra note I,
art. 1017, 32 I.L.M. at 619.
220. CUSFTA, supra note 6, annex 705.4(16), 27 I.L.M. at 324.
221. There are 20 to 30 for CUSFTA and over 50 for NAFTA.
Fall 1993]
Michigan Journal of International Law
weaknesses, the reader should not lose sight of the strong track record
of the basic dispute resolution structure. This Note does not contend that
the system is flawed altogether; however, it does suggest that the
CUSFTA dispute resolution system's success should be seen in the light
of its limited application between two very similar trading partners. It
also suggests that the NAFTA dispute system is not as good as it could
or should be for the needs of ongoing hemispheric integration between
vastly different would-be trading partners.
A. Matters of Commission
This Section of the critique analyzes those NAFTA DRM provisions
which have diverged from the CUSFTA dispute resolution structure.222
The discussion is divided into the following subsections: (1) changes to
the general DRM; (2) changes to the AD/CVD DRM; and (3) changes
to special dispute resolution procedures.
1. Changes to General Dispute Resolution
This set of changes further breaks up into several subsets. They are
the alteration of the overall general DRM structure; modifications to the
rules on use of retaliatory suspensions; 223 and miscellaneous procedural
changes.
a. Structural Changes
Structural changes are those changes which add or subtract steps
from the general DRM. At first glance, the structural changes to the
basic CUSFTA DRM system are impressive: NAFTA consolidates
CUSFTA expert panel and arbitration panel procedures into a single
"arbitral panel" process; 224 it eliminates mandatory arbitration; 221 it
allows for review of retaliatory suspension;226 and it provides a "GATT-
escape" clause. 227 Further examination reveals that only one change -
222. Alterations which are trivial, pm forma, or due primarily to the increase from two
to three members will not be discussed.
223. "Retaliatory suspensions" are the suspensions of benefits of equivalent effect
authorized by both CUSFrA and NAFTA after an unsuccessful attempt at dispute resolution.
See supra notes 82-84, 109 and accompanying text.
224. See supra part I.A.2.a.
225. Cf supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text (describing CUSFTA binding
arbitration).
226. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (providing such review for NAFTA).
227. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
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the "GATT-escape" clause - has direct impact on the NAFTA dispute
resolution structure and its future development.
i. Consolidation and Elimination
The consolidation of the expert panel and arbitration panel processes
eliminated all binding arbitration from the NAFTA general DRM sys-
tem.228 The remaining "arbitral panel" process is actually quite similar to
the "expert panel" CUSFTA system. 229 Thus, it appears that NAFTA has
eliminated an important disputeresolution forum.
Although this elimination seems a bold stroke, the change is not of
great practical importance. As of the date of this writing,230 neither
arbitration process has been used at all under CUSFTA, and there is no
reason to believe there would be great demand for them under NAFTA.
The non-use of the arbitration panel is likely due to the CUSFTA Par-
ties' unwillingness to use any explicitly binding DRM. The only excep-
tions were for problems historically very volatile within and between the
Parties - grain subsidies and escape clause actions - where quick
solution was the primary concern. Evidently, the arbitration panel was a
DRM designed for intractable problems which have not occurred. Thus,
the demise of binding inter-Party arbitration between CUSFTA and
NAFTA is not particularly meaningful for effective dispute settlement.
However, the fact that the difference between the systems still exists in
theory, if not in fact, contributes to the problems of non-integration
discussed infra Part II.B.3.
ii. Review of Retaliatory Suspension
NAFTA provides that any Party may request review of a retaliatory
suspension of trade agreement benefits in order to determine if they are
"manifestly excessive., 23' Although this addition seems a welcome
innovation, both its effectiveness and the need for it are questionable.
The effectiveness of the review is most open to attack because the
relevant NAFTA article232 does not provide a separate remedial measure
if "manifest excessiveness" is found.233 Presumably, a finding of "mani-
fest excessiveness" requires action by the suspending Party, but the
228. Compare supra part I.A.2.a with supra part I.A.2.b.
229. Compare supra part l.A.2.a with supra part I.A.2.b.
230. March 1993.
231. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
232. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2019(3)-(4), 32 I.L.M. at 697-98.
233. This discussion ignores the question of what constitutes "manifest excessiveness."
Difficult questions of line drawing always exist in flexible clauses like this one. Still, a list of
illustrative examples would clarify the concept.
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reviewing panel is only given power to make a determination, not
recommendations. Action on the report seems to be left to the disputing
Parties or to the FTC by default. Since the Party levying "manifestly
excessive" sanctions will necessarily be a member of both groups, it will
be able to block any action because both bodies act by consensus. To
the extent the review produces a swift, independent evaluation of the
matter, it may put some pressure on the retaliating Party to lighten the
sanctions. However, any Party is unlikely to concede that its sanctions
are manifestly excessive, especially given the high tension levels
reached by this stage.
The clause is also unnecessary, for, if a Party retaliates in a "mani-
festly excessive" manner, its victim under either Agreement can always
resort to its own general dispute settlement action based on breach of
the clause limiting retaliatory suspension to a level of "equivalent bene-
fits." 2
34
On the whole, the "manifestly excessive" review clause adds little or
nothing to effective NAFTA dispute settlement. It could become more
effective if the review panel is given power to make recommendations
which are explicitly binding on the retaliating Party. However, to the
extent it creates a different system from CUSFTA, it also exacerbates
the issues of non-integration, discussed infra Part II.B.3.
iii. The "GATT-escape" Clause
The "GATT-escape" clause is the NAFTA provision which allows
Respondents in certain cases to force a Complainant who has chosen
GATT dispute settlement back into NAFTA.235 These cases are disputes
involving specific environment and health provisions of NAFTA.236
Although it appears to be a technical change to the CUSFTA system, it
is actually a stage in an ongoing struggle over environmental and health
measures as they apply to trade relationships.
Few, if any, NAFTA issues have generated the amount and intensity
of controversy as have environment and health.237 Partisans of all de-
234. See NAFrA, supra note I, art. 2019(1), 32 I.L.M. at 697; see also CUSFTA, supra
note 6, art. 1807(9), 27 I.L.M. at 386 (both limiting retaliatory suspensions to "benefits of
equivalent effect.").
235. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
236. See id.
237. Although labor and other political concerns have figured prominently in the
NAFTA debate, see supra notes 3, 7, 18, 19 and accompanying text, the environmental
rhetoric has been strong as well. See, e.g., U.S.-Canadian Relations Hinge on Free Trade
Agreement, Economy, DET. NEWS, Jan. 3, 1993, at IB, 5B (quoting Canadian ambassador to
U.S. describing the importance of the environment and trade to U.S.-Canada relations);
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scription have touted NAFTA as both environmentally safe238 and as an
environmental hazard.239
The debate over the proper relationship of trade to environmental
and health concerns exploded over the "Tuna-Dolphin" case.2 ° In that
Daphne Bramham, U.S. Trade Commissioner Urges Removal of Exchange Barriers, VAN-
COUVER SUN, Apr. 29, 1992, at D6 (citing U.S. International Trade Commissioner who
emphasized consideration of the environment before signing NAFTA); Edward M. Ranger,
Jr., Environment Gains an Edge, Bus. MEX., Oct. 1992, at 38, 38 (noting presidential
candidate Clinton's commitment to "adequate" environmental protection under NAFTA and
quoting Mexican President Salinas' opposition to NAFTA-caused pollution); Environmental
Organizations Propose 'Green Language'for Inclusion in NAFTA, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
973 (June 3, 1992) (documenting environmentalist desire for public participation in har-
monization of NAFTA-Parties' environmental standards). For a general discussion of the
issues surrounding trade and the environment, see John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and
Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1227 (1992).
For a thumbnail discussion of current international environmental issues, see EDITORS OF
THE HARVARD LAW REVIEW, TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1992). The
authors include a section on international dispute resolution. They generally lambast the
international system for failing to develop an operational liability regime. Finally, they close
the dispute resolution section by expressing little faith in the ability. of lawyers to devise such
a regime and instead looking to "diplomats, economists, financiers, and scientists." Id. at
15-45, 46.
238. See, e.g., Brown et al., supra note 3, at 10-11 (concluding that evidence that
NAFTA will cause increased Mexican pollution is inconclusive and that most likely NAFTA
will improve Mexican environmental standards); Steven Greenhouse, Trade Proposal Includes
Import Bans, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1992, at D2 (quoting Ambassador Carla A. Hills, U.S.
Trade Representative, that NAFTA will safeguard U.S. environmental interests and "go
further to address environmental concerns" than any previous trade accord); U.S.-Mexico
Environmental Accord Expected to be Signed Soon, Fisher Says, Int'l Env't Daily (BNA)
(Sept. 14, 1992), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNAIED File (citing a U.S. negotiator
who claims that opposition to NAFTA may be "the biggest environmental mistake of the
decade" and describing the EPA as "pleased" with NAFTA); Ranger, supra note 237, at 38
(quoting President Bush's belief that NAFTA maintains high environmental standards and
encourages improvement and citing the Council of the Americas' conviction that NAFTA will
improve environmental performance).
239. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 19, at A15 (claiming NAFTA may cause environmen-
tal "race to the bottom"); Julie Cazzin, A Blueprint for Freer Markets, MACLEAN'S, Aug. 24,
1992, at 46, 47 (citing "apparently unanimous opinion among environmentalists" that NAFTA
will not prevent or clean up Mexican pollution); ITC Chairman Newquist Says Approval
Processf/or NAFTA May Be Difficult, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 936, 936-37 (May 27, 1992)
(citing congressional and environmental group fears that NAFTA will exacerbate existing
environmental problems); Ranger, supra note 237, at 38 (quoting AFL-CIO Secretary
Treasurer's statement that NAFTA ignores pollution in border communities). Some groups
opposed to NAFTA on environmental grounds brought suit against the United States request-
ing an injunction requiring expeditious filing of an environmental impact statement on the
NAFTA proposal. The district court dismissed for lack of standing. Public Citizen v. Office of
United States Trade Representative, 789 F. Supp. 139 (D.D.C. 1992). The circuit court
affirmed on different grounds. Public Citizen v. Office of United States Trade Representative,
970 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
240. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (GATT Doc. DS2 I/R, Sept. 3, 199 1).
For a thorough discussion of the case, see Ted L. McDorman, The GAT Consistency of U.S.
Fish Import Embargoes to Stop Driftnet Fishing and Save Whales, Dolphins and Turtles, 24
GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 477 (1991). The author concludes that the U.S. import bans
were illegal under GATT. He also opines that GATT will be unable to "accommodate the
emergence of a fully developed international environmental and conservation regime" because
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controversy, the U.S. banned imports of tuna from Mexico because of
Mexico's alleged breach of the U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act.241
A GATT dispute resolution panel ruled against the United States,
reasoning that quotas were not justified under GATT health and envi-
ronment provisions.242 This caused environmental groups to mistrust
GATT intensely.243
Given the explosive atmosphere created by the Tuna-Dolphin deci-
sion and the highly visible opposition to NAFTA by environmental
groups, the "GATT-escape" clause appears to be an effort by NAFTA
proponents to win over environmental advocates. At first glance, it looks
as if the environmental community "wins" under the "GATT-escape"
clause because it allows a country which is accused of environment-
based protectionism to opt out of the forum that produced "Tuna-Dol-
phin." However,' environmental groups quickly took issue with NAFTA
dispute resolution and the proposed "GATT-escape" clause.2' The
environmental groups charge, inter alia, that NAFTA requires Respon-
dents to meet a higher standard of proof than does GATT to justify
trade restrictions based on environmental measures.245 More specifically,
GATT dispute settlement emphasizes trade and not environmental concerns. Id. at 525.
However, the article ends on a positive note, in light of GATT pragmatism when faced with
new problems. Id.
241. 16 U.S.C. 1361-1407 (1988).
242. GAT', supra note 13, art. XX(b),(g).
243. See, e.g., Smith & Whitney, supra note 12, at 582-83 (discussing the likelihood that
U.S. environmental, health, and safety measures will be found illegal under GATT in the
wake of "Tuna-Dolphin"); Stephen G. Hirsch, Free Trade Pact Rapped Over Dispute
Resolution, RECORDER, Sept. 4, 1992, available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, RECRDR File(citing environmentalist dislike of GATT because it does not allow outside expert testimony
and because defendants must prove an environmental measure is not a trade barrier); U.S.,
Mexico and Canada Plan to Establish Trade Commission, Int'l Env't Daily (BNA) (Aug. 4,
1992), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNAIED File (citing Public Citizen's opposition to
leaked draft of NAFTA DRM because there is a possibility of resort to GATT).
244. See Steven Greenhouse, Trade Proposal Includes Import Bans, N.Y. TIMES, July 8,
1992, at D2 (citing environmental groups' concern that NAFTA DRMs will strike down U.S.
environmentally-motivated import bans because of a lack of scientific evidence); Public
Citizen Says NAFTA Summary Falls Short on Environmental Issues, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
1502, 1503 (Aug. 26, .1992) (characterizing NAFTA environmental dispute resolution
provisions as far short of meaningful). Other environmentalists' concerns with NAFTA's
general DRM include its lack of provision for: environmental trade sanctions; upward har-
monization of environmental standards; inclusion of environmental experts; public comment;
and burdening Complainants with proving the existence of an equally effective, less restric-
tive mechanism. See North American Free Trade Agreement Greeted with Suspicion by
Environmental Groups, 15 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 561, 562 (Aug. 26, 1992).
245. GATT, although it produced the Tuna-Dolphin Case, does not require that all
environmental or health-related measures have a sound scientific basis. A good example is the
Beef Hormone Case, where an EC health regulation prohibited the sale of beef which had
been subjected to artificial growth hormone. The United States protested that the artificial hor-
mone method was safe. The EC replied that it did not need scientific justification for the
regulation so long as it was applied equally to domestic and imported beef. For a discussion
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their concern is that NAFTA DRMs will strike down U.S. environment
or health-based import bans, unless they meet a demanding standard of
scientific proof.246 Thus, so the argument goes, the "GATT-escape"
clause allows any environment-hostile Party to attack bothersome trade
laws by demanding a high standard of scientific proof. Further, because
these Parties control the introduction of any scientific input into the
dispute resolution process, NAFTA "stacks the deck" against precaution-
ary measures.247
To a large degree, the NAFTA text can be interpreted this way. It
singles out environmental and health related disputes for special referral
to NAFTA,248 and it allows Parties to control the use of scientific review
boards.249 Disputing Parties must. agree on whether and how to use a
scientific board, and that use is. limited. to questions of fact.25 0 Also, if a
scientific committee is used, its results must be considered.25' Moreover,
NAFTA repeatedly requires that environmental and health standards be
based on scientific evidence. 52 Finally, provisional .environmental and
of the case, see Jackson, supra note 237, at 1237-38. The article also mentions environmen-
talists' concerns about treaties requiring minimum standards of scientific justification. Id. at
1239.
246. See, e.g., Grnups Say Clause Would Permit Challenges to Environmental Laws, 15
Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 657 (Oct. 7, 1992) (alleging that NAFTA exposes U.S. environmental
and consumer laws to challenges as non-tariff barriers under chapters on sanitary,
phytosanitary, and technical standards).
247. The root of this charge is NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 907(3), 32 I.L.M. at 388
(allowing only provisional technical regulations in the absence of scientific information and
requiring completion of any scientific investigation within a-"reasonable period."). See also
infra notes 253-54 and accompanying text.
248. See NAFTA, supra note I, arts. 2005 I1 (1), (3)-(4), 32 I.L.M. at 694.
249. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. The control of input into environmental
dispute procedures seems to be a particularly contentious issue. See, e.g., Focus on Side
Deals, Legislation NWF Official Advises Environmentalists, 16 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 88
(Feb. 10, 1993) (National Wildlife Federation calls for citizen input into dispute process);
Groups Say Clause Would Permit Challenges to Environmental Groups, 15 Int'l Env't Rep.
(BNA) 657 (Oct. 7, 1992) (environmentalists criticize NAFTA's "highly secretive" dispute
resolution procedures); North American Free Trade Agreement Greeted with Suspicion by
Environmental Groups, 15 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 561, 562-63 (Aug. 26, 1992) (reporting
concern of Canadian Member of Parliament on this issue). The author does not entirely reject
this desire for transparency. In the context of national democratic processes it is the accepted,
indeed the presumptively required, norm. However, international disputes are generally
resolved secretly, in part to avoid heightening tension by increased scrutiny. Allowing much
input, rather than complete transparency of process, may be the best solution. For a related
discussion, see Jackson, supra note 237, at 1256-58.
250. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2015(l)-(3), 1.L.M. at 496-97.
251. See id. art. 2015(4), 32 I.L.M. at 697.
252. See id. art. 712(3), 32 I.L.M. at 378 (requiring that sanitary or phytosanitary
measures be based on scientific principles and not be maintained in the absence of a scientific
basis). Additionally, NAFTA requires the existence of a scientific basis for excluding imports
on sanitary or phytosanitary grounds. Id. art. 714(2)(b), 32 I.L.M. at 378. It also requires the
use of relevant scientific evidence in conducting sanitary or phytosanitary risk assessments.
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health measures which may be valid but cannot be scientifically substan-
tiated are subject to attack under NAFTA.253
These provisions allow a country with lower environment or health
standards to challenge any other Party's similar laws which act as a
trade barrier. Furthermore, because scientific inputs are limited to factual
questions, the only issue will be if a regulation meets high scientific fact
standards, not if the scientific board thinks the measure is advisable in
the absence of firm scientific proof. Thus, if an importing Party chal-
lenges a U.S. environmental or health regulation and phrases the ques-
tions purely in terms of facts, it can avoid opinions and "soft science"
policy questions. Moreover, despite the NAFTA provisions which allow
higher standards of environmental protection than the international
minimum, the "hard science" clauses make any environment or health
measure vulnerable. In fact, NAFTA seems to require setting standards
lower than international norms if such norms are insufficiently rooted in
scientific proof. Also, because the dispute proceedings are confiden-
tial,254 no citizen groups can force attention onto "soft-science" based
policy. Finally, the outspoken distrust of U.S. environmental laws by
some Mexican business leaders 255 makes a clash seem inevitable.
2 56
Id. art. 715(l)(b), 32 I.L.M. at 378. In the absence of scientific information, the treaty allows
only provisional sanitary or phytosanitary measures, and any scientific investigation must be
completed in a "reasonable period." Id. art 715(4), 32 I.L.M. at 379. "Scientific basis" is
defined as "a reason based on data or information derived using scientific methods," see id.
art. 724, 32 I.L.M. at 382-83. The treaty also encourages use of available scientific evidence
in assessing the risk of standards adopted in pursuance of "legitimate objectives," see id. art.
907(1), 32 I.L.M. at 387-88, allows only provisional technical regulations in the absence of
scientific information, see id. art 907(3), 32 I.L.M. at 388, and defines "legitimate objectives"
with reference to scientific justification. See id. art. 915, 32 I.L.M. at 391-92.
Related pertinent provisions are NAFTA, arts. 712(1), 713(3), 905(3), id. 32 I.L.M. at
377-78, 387, which allow higher standards of environmental and health protection than the
international minimum.
253. See id. arts. 715(4), 32 I.L.M. at 379, 388 (allowing only provisional sanitary or
phytosanitary measures and provisional technical regulations in the absence of scientific
information and requiring a completion of scientific investigation in a "reasonable period.").
254. See id. art. 2012(l)(b), 32 I.L.M. at 696.
255. Carlos Sandoval, president of the Mexican National Council of Environmental
Industrialists, forcefully criticized U.S. environmental laws, accusing them of being protec-
tionist. Mexican Qfficial Denies Negotiations Under Way on NAFTA Environmental Accord,
16 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 44, 44-45 (Jan. 27, 1993).
256. Some environmental critics regards the "GATT-escape" clause as the Machiavellian
triumph of industrialists and free-trade proponents. The argument is that governments pass
precautionary environmental laws in order to placate their environmental constituents,
knowing full well that they will be challenged under NAFTA for lack of a scientific basis.
When preemptive measures are then struck down, the government in question can claim that
it tried, thus allowing free-traders to have their cake and eat it too. The importance of the
"GATT-escape" clause is that it ensures review under NAFTA's scientific justification
regime, even if the challenging Party obtusely brings a GATT action. The country which
originally imposed the measures can disingenuously claim to be avoiding GATT's environ-
mentally hostile regime.
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Whatever the intention of the NAFTA proponents who included the
GATT-escape clause, it appears to have backfired. It helped focus
environmental groups' attention onto dispute resolution and damaged the
legitimacy of NAFTA within this very visible and activist segment of
the public. These effects strengthen calls for special "environmental"
trade sanctions and a special "environmental" dispute DRM257 in two
ways. First, they increase the perceived problems of handling environ-
ment and health disputes via NAFTA's general DRM. Second, the.
"GATT-escape" clause establishes a dangerous precedent of treating
environment and health disputes differently, thus making a special DRM
seem less objectionable. The movement for special environmental dis-
pute resolution provisions in turn continues the trend towards a
"balkanized" dispute resolution system, which is discussed infra Part
II.A.3. Finally, it contributes to concerns caused by the non-integration
of CUSFTA and NAFTA, a problem which is further discussed infra
Part II.B.3. The "GATT-escape" clause is likely to cause more trouble
than it is worth and should not have been included in NAFTA.
b. Changes to Rules on Retaliatory Suspension
NAFTA makes two changes affecting the use of retaliatory sanc-
tions. First, it adds a "weak" rule that retaliatory suspensions be within
the sector of the original breach when "effective" and "practicable." '258
Second, it eliminates the CUSFTA requirement that retaliation be used
only if "fundamental interests" are harmed.259 The language of both
these provisions is more normative than prescriptive, and the impact
upon parties' behavior of the NAFTA .changes is weaker than it other-
wise would be. This is also true because the relevant terms in both
The author does not know if these beliefs are widely held. They were expressed in a
discussion following a debate on "NAFTA and the Environment," organized in November
1992 by Professor John H. Jackson at the University of Michigan Law School.
257. See, e.g., Baucus Outlines Safeguards He Says are Essential for Acceptable NAFTA,
9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1020-21 (June 10, 1992) (Sen. Baucus (Democrat-Mont.) calling
for use of environmental experts as panelists, and for input by interested NGOs, in NAFTA
environmental disputes); Focus on Side Deals, Legislation NWF Qfficial Advises Environmen-
talists, 16 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 88 (Feb. 10, 1993) (discussing the prospect of a proposed
North American Commission on the Environment taking part in environmental dispute
resolution); Mexican Official Denies Negotiations Under Way on NAFTA Environmental
Accord, 16 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 44, 44 (Jan. 27, 1993) (reporting the Mexican govern-
ment's proposal to create a permanent tri-national environmental commission to help resolve
environmental disputes).
258. See NAFTA, supra note I, art. 2019(2), 32 I.L.M. at 697. The rule is "weak,"
because it allows cross-sectoral suspension, where sectoral suspension is not "practicable" or
"effective." See id. This gives NAFTA members much 'leeway for cross-sectoral sanctions.
259. Compare id. art. 2019, 32 I.L.M. at 697-98 with CUSFrA, supra note 6, art.
1807(9), 27 I.L.M. at 386.
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NAFTA and CUSFTA have no objective meaning. In other words, the
Party using sanctions decides what is "effective and practicable" under
NAFTA, as well as what constitutes a "fundamental interest" under
CUSFTA. Taken together, however, the changes shift the emphasis from
discouraging the use of sanctions for trivial infractions (in any event an
unlikely occurrence) to discouraging cross-sectoral retaliation. This shift
reflects a desire to contain trade problems to one sector in order to
minimize chances of an expanding trade war.26 Although these modifi-
cations positively affect dispute resolution to the extent that such goals
are actually accomplished, they also create differences between
CUSFTA and NAFTA dispute settlement systems which may add to the
tension of non-integration, discussed infra Part II.B.3.
c. Miscellaneous Procedural Changes
NAFTA institutes a series of relatively minor procedural changes to
the CUSFTA general dispute system which generally improve the dis-
pute settlement system in small ways. They include: requiring more
specific expertise of NAFTA panelists; 261 prohibiting selection of a
Party's own citizens to serve on an arbitral panel;262 allowing perempto-
ry challenges of non-roster panelists; 263 providing standard terms of
reference;2 64 and including a requirement that "nullification or impair-
ment" be specifically alleged.265
The changes affecting panelist qualification and selection improve
the efficiency and precision of the process. The requirement of special
expertise increases the corporate knowledge of panelists and makes them
less dependent on outside advice. Prohibiting the choice of a Party's
own citizens decreases the ability of disputing Parties to choose panel-
ists who are prejudiced in their favor. Finally, allowing peremptory
challenges of non-roster panelists forces Parties to agree on them. This
in turn enhances the legitimacy of the system and its product by de-
260. Cf JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING GATT, supra note 14, at 98 (characterizing cross-
sector retaliation as a "potentially explosive issue" in the GATT reform context).
261. Compare NAFTA, supra note I, art. 2009(2)(a), 32 I.L.M. at 695 with CUSFrA,
supra note 6, art. 1807(1), 27 I.L.M. at 385.
262. Compare NAFTA, supra note I, art. 2011, 32 I.L.M. at 696 with CUSFrA, supra
note 6, art. 1807(3), 32 I.L.M. at 385.
263. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2011(3), 32 I.L.M. at 696.
264. See supra notes 68-70, 101 and accompanying text; see also Hage, supra note 12,
at 368-69 (noting similar problems with vague CUSFTA terms of reference procedure and
recommending standard terms of reference modeled on GATT).
265. Compare NAFTA, supra note I, art. 2012(5), 32 I.L.M. at 696 with CUSFTA,
supra note 6, art. 1807(5), 27 I.L.M. at 385.
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creasing even more the probability of introducing biased or incompetent
panelists to the process.
Providing standard terms of reference and mandating their use
unless otherwise agreed in twenty days increases the efficiency of the
system by eliminating the possibility that parties will fray over the issue.
Furthermore, standard terms of reference will help avoid problems of a
Panel which interprets terms of reference differently than would the
Parties. 266 Requiring that "nullification or impairment" be specifically
alleged complicates a Panel's ability to rule on this cause of action. This
requirement, when viewed in conjunction with the omission of "nullific-
ation" or "impairment" from the standard terms of reference, signifies
that disputants must agree to use them. This further reduces the likeli-
hood of using "nullification or impairment" as a cause of action, and for
reasons discussed infra Part II.B.l.a, such a result would constitute a
positive development. The improvements brought about by these chang-
es must be weighed against the tensions caused by their creation of
separate CUSFTA and NAFTA dispute resolution systems.267
2. Changes to the AD/CVD Dispute Resolution Provisions
NAFTA changed the CUSFTA AD/CVD DRM in a few ways. The
important alterations 26 are the creation of special committee review
269
and the abandonment of the harmonization of AD/CVD laws.270 Both of
these changes arguably improve the system.
Special committee review, as a safeguard against tampering with a
highly-regarded, effective DRM, incrementally improves NAFTA over
CUSFTA. However, given the general confidence in the system, 271 its
necessity is questionable.
The attempt to harmonize U.S. and Canadian AD/CVD laws has
266. Cf. Hage, supra note 12, at 368-69 (describing similar problems of interpretation
for CUSFTA and GATT and GATT's solution of standard terms of reference).
267. See infra part II.B.3.
268. The lengthening of the extraordinary challenge period from 30 to 90 days, see supra
notes 175-76 and accompanying text, is not of particular importance. However, it does give
the Parties additional time to settle a dispute diplomatically, and gives panelists more time to
review the evidence in complex cases. In this respect it provides some flexibility to the
system.
269. See supra part l.B.2.d.
270. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
271. See supra note 117 and accompanying text; u f supra note 118 and accompanying
text.
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evidently floundered272 and was probably never a realistic goal.273 The
entire NAFTA system, already much more complex than CUSFTA, is
well rid of the extra strain. However, there is no clear abrogation in
NAFTA of the CUSFTA harmonization attempt,274 and the harmoniza-
tion attempt between the U.S. and Canada is still theoretically valid.
Both the possibility of continued progress toward harmonized U.S.-
Canadian AD/CVD laws and the special committee process create highly
visible differences between the two systems. Whatever incremental
improvement they provide could well be outweighed by their contribu-
tion to the misperceptions caused by non-integration.275
3. Changes to Special Dispute Resolution Provisions
NAFTA alters the special dispute resolution provisions of CUSFTA
in several ways, described in detail supra Part II.C. Some highlights are
that NAFTA develops two new special DRMs (financial services and
investment); eliminates one special DRM (government grain support);
and deformalizes but retains another ("escape clause"). It also creates
one exclusion (competition laws) and expands another set (exclusions
from "nullification or impairment"). Moreover, NAFTA adds the
"GATT-escape" clause, which has contributed to calls for developing
yet another special DRM.276 Finally, it preserves and expands the net-
work of specialized consultations, some of which may develop into
formal DRMs of their own, as did financial services. Taken together,
these changes indicate an ongoing willingness to splinter or "balkanize"
272. See Canada Set to Negotiate Antidumping Changes in Trilateral Free Trade Talks,
Qfficial Says, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 441, 441-42 (Mar. 20, 1991) (citing a lack of U.S.
political will and a Canadian consensus on moving ahead with AD harmonization); Bob
White, Average Canadian Won't Benefit from NAFTA, FINANCIAL POST, Aug. 31, 1992, at
S4, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, FINPST File (documenting Canadian labor leader's
belief that NAFTA cancels CUSFTA's subsidies law harmonization commitment).
273. In this case, interface rather than integration should be the goal of trade law.
Compare JACKSON, supra note 9, at 218-21 (describing international trade law as a means of
interface between different legal systems) and JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING GATT, supra note
14, at 83-84 (advocating broad concept of "interface accommodation" even for very similar
countries) with JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM J. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 724 (1986) [hereinafter JACKSON & DAVEY] (discussing
irreconcilably opposing national views on the proper scope of subsidization). But cf McDor-
man, supra note 12, at 320 (expressing continued Canadian concern over the vulnerability of
social programs to U.S. CVD actions); Carlsen, supra note 12, at 320, 322 (doubting Canadi-
an satisfaction with use of the AD/CVD dispute resolution system instead of AD/CVD
harmonization).
274. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
275. See infra part ll.B.3.
276. See supra note 258 (noting call for special environmental dispute resolution
arrangements).
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dispute settlement procedures, much as GATT has in the past.277
All this ferment indicates increasing involvement of special interest
groups in the dispute settlement process as each group attempts to carve
out its own exception to the general rule.278 This is not a thoroughly
ominous development because specialization also brings expertise and
relative sectoral efficiency.279 However, such expertise could be provided
just as well by an expert panel.280
A "balkanized" dispute settlement system may weaken the prospects
of successful conflict resolution. It increases the chances of finding a
biased forum, thus encouraging forum shopping. It duplicates effort and
wastes valuable resources. It creates "special deals" and other perceived
inequities28" ' which detract from the legitimacy of the system. It leads to
systems of "competing" procedures 282 which add extra strain to any
dispute resolution structure. Furthermore, it increases the complexity of
the system, making it more difficult to understand and use effectively
and further delegitimizing its processes, especially in the eyes of smaller
countries. 3 Because many potential WHFTA partners are smaller
277. See, e.g., JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING GATT, supra note 14, at 98 (discussing the
phenomenon of GATT DRM specialization and expansion).
278. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 1, annex 2004(1), 32 I.L.M. at 699 (partially exempt-
ing energy and automotive industries from nullification or impairment).
279. See, e.g., Anderson & Fried, supra note 14, at 413 (op'ining that CUSFTA's many
different DRMs have worked quite well); Leonard Bierman & Donald R. Fraser, The Canada-
United States Free Trade Agreement and U.S. Banking: Implications for Policy Reform, 29
VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 29 (1988) (describing specialized DRMs as an important step in the
development of "global banking"); Charles W. Levesque, Comment, Chapter 13 of the United
States-Canada Free Trade Agreement: Has It Created An Open and Effective Government
Procurement Dispute Resolution System?, 12 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 187, 214-15 (1991)
(concluding that certain specialized DRMs are transparent and effective).
280. Cf NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2014, 32 I.L.M. at 695 (allowing the use of experts
to help NAFTA general dispute panels).
28 1. For example, it exempts the automotive and textile industries from "nullification or
impairment." See supra note 278.
282. Cf JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING GAT, supra note 14, at 65 (describing disputes
over which GATT resolution procedures involved parties should pursue).
283. JACKSON describes this problem in the context of the GATT system.
There is ... a considerable problem with the multitude of different dispute proce-
dures now provided in [the GAIT system]. Such a situation creates disputes about
the appropriate forum, and confusion about the procedures and their complexity.
This makes it more difficult for smaller countries to understand and use the proce-
dure effectively. Thus, the new [GATT] organization should set up a unified
procedure.... The W[orld] T[rade] O[rganization] chapter on disputes would set
forth a common set of procedures for [bilateral consultation, mediation and con-
ciliation, and an impartial panel ruling], and this would go a long way to avoid
'forum shopping' and forum disputes. It would provide a common set of detailed
procedures and allow the experience and evolution of those procedures to develop
naturally and centrally, so that such experience would apply to all future disputes
(avoiding 'reinventing the wheel' in each treaty procedure).
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countries, continued "balkanization" is a detrimental feature of NAFTA,
in terms of providing a basis for WHFrA.
Moreover, the international trade community has recognized the
flaws of specialization, as reflected in calls to streamline GATT's
"balkanized" dispute settlement system.284 This is an area where NAFTA
negotiators ignored international experience to the- detriment of the
system as a whole. They should have listened to GATT reformers and
created a stronger, more integrated dispute settlement system.
B. Matters of Omission
This section of the critique focuses on changes that should have
been effected in NAFTA. It is more anticipatory than the last section be-
cause it attempts to detect problems which could hamper both the use
and development of NAFTA's dispute resolution system.
1. Problems with the General Dispute Resolution System
The NAFTA general dispute system strongly resembles the
CUSFTA expert panel process from which it is derived.285 The CUSFTA
expert panel system in turn is based on the GATT dispute resolution
mechanism. 286 Although CUSFTA general DRM was an attempt to avoid
the weaknesses of GATT,287 both CUSFTA and NAFTA share two of
GATT's primary weaknesses: "nullification or impairment" and the
inability to produce a truly binding DRM.288
a. Nullification or Impairment
NAFTA inherited the concept of "nullification or impairment" from
Id. at 98.
284. See, e.g., Draft Text Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTN.TNCIW/FA, at 92 (Dec. 20, 1991) (proposing. In-
tegrated Dispute Settlement System for GATT); JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING GATT, supra note
14, at 97-98 (advocating a unified GATT DRM).
285. See supra part l.A.2.a-b.
286. See, e.g., Horlick, supra note 117, at 9 (describing CUSFTA general DRM as
"essentially a replica of GATT as it existed in 1987"); Smith & Whitney, supra note 12, at
569-70 (characterizing CUSFTA as based on GATT).
287. See Anderson & Fried, supra note 14, at 398-400 (claiming CUSFTA general DRM
was negotiated to avoid some of the troubles of GATT).
288. To be fair, NAFTA and CUSFTA general DRMs have avoided some problems of
GATT, such as long lag-times, poor-quality decisions, interference by uninvolved third
countries, and lack of independent, informed panelists. See Anderson & Fried, supra note 14,
at 402.
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GATT.289 Its exact meaning remains unclear,290 but the landmark GATT
"Australian Sulphate" case 29' determined that no breach of GATT had to
occur fora GATT benefit to be nullified or impaired. 292 NAFTA has
apparently accepted this definition, for it explicitly states that a Party
may bring an arbitral panel action based on "nullification or impair-
ment" by a measure "not inconsistent" with NAFTA293 This cause of
action creates a situation in which a Party can fully observe its obliga-
tions under NAFTA and still have an action brought against it for
trespassing on an unnegotiated, but nevertheless "reasonably expected,"
benefit.
It makes little sense to define a cause of action based on so ephem-
eral a concept because it creates uncertainty between trading partners
about the possible effects of their actions.294 A "reasonably expected"
benefit should be based upon a text, not upon implicit expectations. If a
Party thinks a trade benefit is important enough to protect, that Party
should negotiate for it and put all Parties on notice that it is protected.295
It is more sensible to hold that a Party can reasonably expect not to be
held liable for unnegotiated items than to hold that a Party can reason-
ably expect compensation for infringement of unnegotiated implicit
expectations.
.Including "nullification or impairment" as a cause of action gives
any Party which is displeased with the legal acts of its partners a chance
to win compensation based upon implicit expectations. Frequent resort
to this clause will detract from a system's legitimacy296 by creating both
uncertainty and perceived inequity. NAFTA negotiators should have
taken the opportunity to jettison "nullification or impairment" and to
insist that all actions be based upon inconsistency with the trade agree-
ment. This is not the sort of legacy to pass on to WHFTA.
289. See JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 273, at 346 (describing the centrality of "nu-
llification or impairment" to GATT dispute resolution); JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING GATT,
supra note 14, at 62.
290. See, e.g., JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING GATT, supra note 14, at 62, 98 (characterizing
"nullification or impairment" as "ambiguous" and imprecise); McDorman, supra note 12, at
306 (exact meaning of "nullification or impairment" is unclear).
291. The Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate, Report adopted by the Contracting
Parties on 3 April, 1950 (GATT/CP.4/39).
292. Id. at 11 11-13; JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING GATT, supra note 14, at 62.
293. NAFTA, supra note 1, annex 2004(1), 32 I.L.M. at 699.
294. Cf. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING GAIT, supra note 14, at 98 (characterizing GATT
"nullification or impairment" as working against stability and predictability).
295. Cf. id. (calling for elimination of "nullification or impairment" in favor of com-
plaints based on "agreed (treaty) obligations which bind the defending nation.").
296. But cf. McDorman, supra note 12, at 306 (characterizing "nullification or impair-
ment" as necessary to ensure the widest possible scope for general dispute settlement).
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b. Failure to Produce a Binding DRM
At first glance, the NAFTA arbitral panel decision and the CUSFTA
expert panel system on which it is based appear to be binding. After all,
the agreements provide that resolution of a dispute will normally be
based on an arbitral (or expert) Panel's decision, and gives a Com-
plainant the right to suspend benefits if no resolution is reached. 7 Yet
there is a widely held belief that the CUSFTA expert panel decision is
not binding;2 98 by analogy, neither is NAFTA's. The skepticism is due
to several sources: the perceived ineffectiveness of the retaliatory sanc-
tions;299 a careful reading of the NAFTA (or CUSFIA) text; and com-
parison to the CUSFTA clause on binding arbitration.
The retaliatory sanctions provided by NAFTA are ineffective, at
least against the United States, because of the size difference and rela-
tive trade dependence of Mexico and Canada on the United States. 300 A
retaliatory suspension of benefits of "equivalent effect"30'I would, hurt
297. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2019(1), 32 I.L.M. at 697; CUSFTA, supra note 6,
art. 1807(9), 27 I.L.M. at 386.
298. See, e.g., Hage, supra note 12, at 363-65, 375-76 (characterizing CUSFTA chapter
18 as non-binding and describing suspension of benefits "of equivalent effect" as difficult to
apply because of lack of guidance on the issue); Horlick, supra note 117, at 9 (claiming
CUSFTA expert panel process does not produce a binding result); Kevin C. Kennedy,
International Commercial Arbitration Legislation in the State of Michigan: A Proposal, 4
DET. C. L. REv. 867, 920-21 (1990) (predicting any CUSFrA expert panel will be no dif-
ferent from GATT because it is up to the offending Party to accede to a panel decision, and
because it provides an ineffective sanction); Linda C. Reif, Conciliation as a Mechanism for
the Resolution of International Economic and Business Disputes, 14 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 578,
600 (1990-91) (contrasting non-binding "diplomatic" CUSFTA expert panel to binding
"adjudicative" arbitration panel); Carlsen, supra note 12, at 321-22 (criticizing NAFTA
DRMs as being of questionable binding power).
299. See Hage, supra note 12, at 375-76 (describing suspension of benefits "of equiva-
lent effect" as difficult to apply, because of lack of guidance on the issue); Kennedy, supra
note 298, at 920-21 (characterizing retaliatory suspension as an ineffective sanction).
300. For example, the United States exported goods worth $33.28 billion to Mexico and
$85.1 billion to Canada in 1991. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, U.S.
FOREIGN TRADE HIGHLIGHTS i99i, at 11 (1992). During the same year, it imported $31.19
billion from Mexico, and $91.14 billion from Canada. Id. at 15. The U.S. total exports in
1991 were $422 billion, and imports were $488 billion. Id. at 3. Thus, Canada received 20%
of U.S. exports and sent 18.6% of U.S. imports, while Mexico accounted for 7. 1 % of all U.S.
trade.
During the same period, the United States received 75% of Canada's exports, and sent
70% of its imports. See Clyde H. Farnsworth, U.S. Trade Pact a Spur to Canada, N.Y.
TIMES, July 22, 1992, at DI, D1I. The United States accounted for 70% of all Mexican
foreign trade in 1991. See The U.S. International Trade Commission's Report on the NAFTA:
The Verdict's in, Bus. MEX., Mar. 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT File.
301. Moreover, the definition of "equivalent effect" is unclear. It could mean equivalent
in terms of "dollar" amount, percentage of trade affected, percentage of GNP affected, or
something else. Regardless of the definition, it would be difficult and painful for countries
smaller than the United States to levy effective sanctions.
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Canada and Mexico proportionately more than the United States. The
only hope that Canada and Mexico would have in levying sanctions is
to bring sufficient pain to bear on a segment of the U.S. economy which
has enough influence to pressure the government.
Careful reading of the NAFTA text reveals that it always stops short
of calling, the. arbitral panel's decision "binding." 302 Thus, a panel's
decision is more of a guideline than a mandate. Finally, analogy to
CUSFTA's expert and binding arbitration panels reinforces a construc-
tion that the arbitral panel is a non-binding entity. Because CUSFTA
specifies that its arbitration panel is binding and fails to so specify in
the case of its expert panel, it is reasonable to believe that the CUSFTA
expert panel decision is not binding. Furthermore, because the NAFTA
arbitral panel is based on the CUSFTA expert panel, it is also reason-
able to believe it is not strictly binding either.
As in the case of nullification or impairment, lack of a truly binding
general DRM is a characteristic difficulty which will make NAFTA
DRMs less effective and'NAFTA's expansion less desirable. However, a
solution to this problem is elusive given the likely inability of Canada,
Mexico, or any potential WHFTA member to effectively sanction the
United States as a whole.303 Be that as it may, a helpful first step would
be to make arbitral panel decisions (or the WHFTA equivalent) explicit-
ly binding. At least this would put moral and legal pressure on a defiant
losing Party by eliminating its ability to argue that a decision is not
binding. In order to place some political restraint on a panel, decisions
could be overruled by unanimous action of the FTC (or WHFTA equiv-
alent). Although this solution does not address the problem of inade-
quate retaliation for non-U.S. countries, it makes obligations crystal
clear. Thus, disregard of a panel decision would be a clear violation of
international law.
2. Problems with the AD/CVD Dispute Resolution System
This problem with the AD/CVD dispiute resolution system are
particularly legalistic and procedural. They are cumulation, proper use of
302. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2018, 32 I.L.M. at 697; cf CUSFTA, supra note 6,
art. 1802(8), 27 I.L.M. at 386.
303. Looking ahead to WHFTA, the author discussed this problem with several Latin
American trade lawyers and students. They suggested that a solution might be to make
retaliation optional (or compulsory) for non-disputing Parties. Thus, the defiant loser receives
a concentrated injury, while the harm of levying sanctions is spread out widely. However, the
political difficulties of this type of requirement seem insurmountable. Many countries would
have to bear the cost of giving credibility to the system. Also, to the extent the other coun-
tries are dependent on U.S. trade, successful retaliation may still be a Pyrrhic victory, hurting
the other countries as much as, or more than, the United States. The short-term costs to
economies and inter-American relations seem too high.
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domestic law, and a "cumbersome" selection process.
"Cumulation" is the required U.S. practice of combining all of an
imported product found to be dumped or actionably subsidized, regard-
less of country of origin, in order for the International Trade Commis-
sion to make an AD or CVD injury determination. 304 This practice
creates a jurisdictional problem in the event of an injury determination
involving a NAFTA country and a non-NAFTA country. If the harm
caused by the NAFTA country's products is not separable from that
caused by a non-NAFTA country, and the case is brought simultaneous-
ly before the Court of International Trade (CIT) and a NAFTA
AD/CVD panel, neither will have jurisdiction to hear the case.305 In fact,
the AD/CVD panel may be subject to extraordinary challenge if it
does. 306 As NAFTA (or WHFTA) expands south to selected Latin
American countries, this scenario will be ever more likely because of
similar imports from member and non-member Latin countries. One
possible solution is a statutory amendment, exempting NAFTA (and
eventually WHFTA) members from U.S. cumulation laws.307
NAFTA requires an AD/CVD panel, in making its determination, to
apply the law as would a court of the importing Party. 38 This includes
using judicial precedent. 309 It remains unclear what the panel should do
in the case of split decisions or in a case of first impression. 3' From a
U.S. perspective, it is clearly not the intent of NAFTA to give an
AD/CVD panel a free hand whenever conflicting CIT opinions apply to
the matter before it or whenever new issues arise. Also, this possibility
304. Cumulation is required by the 1984 Trade and Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1301,
1677(7)(C)(iv) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). See JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 273, at 711-13
for a discussion of cumulation.
305. Compare NAFrA, supra note 1, art. 1904(11), 32 I.L.M. at 683 (prohibiting resort
to a domestic court for a matter brought before a NAFTA AD/CVD panel) with art.
1904(10)(b), 32 I.L.M. at 683 (excluding cases appealed under judicial review of any Party
from the jurisdiction of NAFTA).
306. See id. art. 1904 (13)(a)(iii), 32 I.L.M. at 683 (allowing extraordinary challenge if
panel exceeds its jurisdiction).
307. See Kennedy, supra note 116, at 10 1-103 (discussing similar problem for CUSFTA
and suggesting statutory exemption from cumulation as a solution).
308. Compare NAFTA, supra note I, art. 1904(2), 32 I.L.M. at 683 (requiring AD/CVD
panel to rely on an importing Party's law to the extent a court of the importing party would)
with id. art. 1904(3), 32 I.L.M. at 683 (requiring panel to use a specified standard of review
and the same general principles that a court of the importing party would use).
309. Id. art. 1904(2), 32 I.L.M. at 683.
310. See Murphy, supra note 14, at 610-11 (discussing parallel problem in CUSFTA).
This problem is not theoretical. A paper by one scholar revealed that three of four disputes
examined could not be decided by looking to existing precedent, because they either involved
issues not yet decided or decided differently on similar issues. See Lowenfeld, supra note
116.
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could become the basis of a protectionist attack on NAFTA, as a threat
to national sovereignty.31' One possible solution is to give the panel an
expedited interlocutory appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (CAFC). This, of course, ignores the costs of putting a heavier
case load on the CAFC and of possibly lengthening the AD/CVD pro-
cess. These costs are likely too high to justify, and a more pragmatic
solution may be to continue to trust the good faith and judgment of the
panelists.312
On a purely practical level, the "cumbersome" panel selection
process is already a problem with CUSFTA.3 13 This is exacerbated by
the heavy workload under which the National Secretariats labor.314
Moreover, because many roster members are prominent trade lawyers,
they are frequently involved in multiple projects. Hence, they cannot
serve as panelists while serving as counsel for another panel, which
makes finding eligible panelists very difficult. 31 5 Moreover, the CUSFTA
general dispute panel has a similar problem. 316 There is no reason to
believe this will be different under NAFTA. A possible solution is
expanding the roster to include non-lawyers but requiring the panel chair
to be a lawyer.3 7 Another is replacing temporary AD/CVD panels (and
perhaps also the expert panel) with a permanent tribunal.
A permanent tribunal would relieve the Secretariat of having to find
311. One can easily imagine protectionist factions raising the specter of Canadian,
Mexican, or other WHFrA panelists "dictating" U.S. law as a ploy to stir up xenophobic
national reaction.
312. For an intriguing, if occasionally far-fetched, discussion of this problem, see
Kennedy, supra note 116, at 97-100. One prominent practitioner made the related observation
that the United States got the short end of the stick on the matter of standard of review
applied by CUSFTA AD/CVD panels. He claimed that the Canadian judicial standard for
overturning administrative decisions is that they be "patently unreasonable." Hence, a panel
reviewing a Canadian decision would have to apply this standard. By contrast, the U.S.
standard is what he called "moderately searching." He blames the differing standard for the
disparity between the number of Canadian requests to review U.S. decisions and U.S. requests
to review Canadian decisions. See Horlick, supra note 117, at 12.
313. See Murphy, supra note 14, at 598-99 (detailing difficulties in administering
CUSFTA AD/CVD panel selection process).
314. See id. at 602 (relating how CUSFTA National Secretariats are swamped with the
administrative tasks of scheduling and administering panels). Moreover, the increased
workloads of the FTC and its Secretariat will make the situation worse for NAF'A. See supra
notes 28-36 and accompanying text (documenting increased workload).
315. Murphy, supra note 14, at 600-601; tcf NAFTA, supra note I, annex 1901.2(11), 32
I.L.M. at 688 (prohibiting such conflicting appearances); see also Hage, supra note 12, at 370
(noting similar problems under CUSFTA general dispute resolution panels).
316. See Hage, supra note 12, at 370. GATT has also had difficulty finding suitable
panelists. See JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING GATT, supra note 14, at 65; Horlick, supra note
117, at 7.
317. See Murphy, supra note 14, at 600-601 (making same suggestion in a CUSFTA
context).
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eligible panelists. If handled correctly, it could become a prestigious
assignment for trade law specialists. Moreover, it would create a body
which could develop a special expertise in NAFTA/WHFTA law, in-
creasing efficiency in the process. Also, tribunal members would be-
come more familiar with the different legal systems of the other member
countries than temporary panelists are likely to be. The jurisdiction of a
permanent tribunal would have to be strictly limited to NAFTA/WHFTA
matters. On issues of national law it would have to defer to national
courts and perhaps have an expedited interlocutory appeal. However,
this would also entail costs of delay and a burden on domestic court
systems.
The Parties could also consider a more flexible private right of
action than NAFTA allows in case the administrative trade barrier of
choice shifts from AD/CVD to another issue such as environmental or
health standards.31t Of course, with expanded private actions, the tribu-
nal risks being overwhelmed with claims. To deter frivolous claims, the
winner should presumptively be awarded costs, unless some pressing
question of public controversy were involved.
If such a tribunal's function were expanded to general dispute
resolution as well, this would alleviate the problems of finding general
dispute panelists. 319 The tribunal could still call on expert and scientific
committees, as with the NAFTA arbitral panel. Its decisions affecting
disputes between the Parties would be binding. Because .a permanent
tribunal could develop prestige over time and its opinions carry more
inherent weight, it would create a more "binding" dispute resolution
decision. Moreover, such a tribunal could act as the focal point of an
integrated dispute resolution system and help reverse the "balkanizing"
tendencies discussed supra Part II.A.3.320 Finally, to keep some check on
the permanent tribunal's power, it could be overruled by consensus of
the FTC or equivalent WHFTA body.
318. There is actually a growing movement for more private access to international trade
dispute systems. See, e.g., Horlick, supra note 117, at 14-15 (calling for rethinking the role of
private parties in international trade disputes and suggesting that taking dispute resolution
away from governments will make it easier to manage); Jackson, supra note 237, at 1257
(suggesting greater access to participatation in dispute resolution as a possible innovation to
GATT); Lowenfeld,, supra note 116, at 335 (advocating reconsideration of private party
participation in intergovernmental economic disputes); cf. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING GATT,
supra note 14, at 76-77 (suggesting eventual consideration of private access to GATT DRMs).
See also, Leon E. Trakman, Privatizing Dispute Resolution under the Free Trade Agreement.:
Truth or Fancy?, 40 ME. L. REV. 349 (1988) (providing an interesting discussion of private
dispute resolution with respect to international trade).
319. See supra note 316 and accompanying text.
320. Cf JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING GATT, supra note 14, at 95, 97-99 (discussing how
a strong World Trade Organization could help integrate disparate GATT DRMs).
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Of course, any permanent institution would have its financial and
political costs, but its potential to alleviate some of the weaknesses of
the NAFTA system may well outweigh them. In any event, it deserves
more consideration than it has received so far.
3. Systemic Problems
Perhaps the most troublesome flaw of the NAFTA dispute resolution
system is the failure to fully integrate the NAFTA and CUSFTA dispute
resolution structures. This creates a two-track system for which there is
no apparent practical reason. Moreover, there is evidence that Mexico is
dissatisfied with the separate CUSFTA dispute resolution system from
which it may be excluded. This evidence includes leaked earlier draft
texts of the NAFTA, in which Mexico pressed for referral to NAFTA of
all disputes arising both under NAFTA and CUSFTA, while Canada and
the United States wanted the option to resort solely to CUSFTA. 32' The
compromise reached was to omit all reference to the relationship be-
tween CUSFTA and NAFTA dispute settlement systems in the final
draft of the NAFTA.
This uneasy compromise may reflect the possibility that Canada and
the United States are interested in preserving an Anglophone clique in
which to settle their differences without interference by Latin American
countries. To the extent that the systems differ,322 CUSFTA can be seen
to have "special provisions" which apply only to the United States and
Canada. This increases the impression of unequal hemispheric integra-
tion.
. A good example is the "escape clause" issue. In CUSFTA, the
United States and Canada are willing to submit their differences on this
issue to compulsory binding arbitration,323 while:"escape clause" actions
are only given consultations in NAFTA, followed by unilateral action.324
This difference may create a perception that Canada and the United
321. See Draft of NAFTA Dispute Resolution Text Dated June 17, 1992 and July 14,
1992, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1358, 1359 (Aug. 5, 1992) (reproducing leaked text art.
2306); see also Smith & Whitney, supra note 12, at 592 (reporting differing views of Canada,
the United States and Mexico regarding the proper scope of NAFTA dispute settlement);
NAFTA Dispute Settlement Issues Discussed at Lawyer's Meeting, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
639 (Apr. 8, 1992) (reporting that Canada wanted the option to resort to either forum but that
the United States and Mexico want primary resort to NAFT7A); NAFTA Panel Review May
Raise Mexican Constitutional Issues, Advisor Says, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 683 (Apr. 15,
1992).,
322. See supra parts II.A.l.a.i.-iii, lI.A.lb, II.A.2, II.B.3 (cataloging differences between
NAFTA and CUSFTA).
323. See CUSFIA, supra note 6, art. 1103, 27 I.L.M. at 352.
324. See NAFrA, supra note 1, arts. 801(4), 802(6), 804, 32 I.L.M. at 383-84.
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States believe that they can trust each other to settle such differences
correctly but cannot trust the Latin Americans to do so. Moreover, the
United States and Canada deal with each other in an adjudicatory, rule-
governed setting, while reserving the option to deal with Mexico and
other Latin American countries in a negotiations setting, where relative
strength wins. Thus, the Anglophone countries treat each other as
equals, but not Latin America. These problems of implication will
multiply if NAFTA expands throughout Latin America, where there is
still much residual mistrust of the United States, if not Canada.
This is not to say that Canada and the United States intended to
slight Mexico or other future Latin American partners. There could well
be valid reasons to keep the CUSFTA dispute resolution separate, such
as wanting to avoid any clash between Latin American civil law and the
common law system. 25 However, such interface problems will have to
be solved in the NAFTA forum anyway, and a strong argument can be
made that Canada and the United States should be willing to be exposed
to the interface, especially if NAFTA does expand. Finally, any short-
term practical gains of using CUSFTA instead of NAFTA may well be
outweighed by the resentment it causes in Mexico and prospective
WHFTA members. If NAFTA really is the next step to greater hemi-
spheric cooperation, this is a flawed beginning to the journey.
One possible solution is to abrogate the CUSFTA dispute resolution
system in favor of the NAFTA system. Another is to synthesize them
into a third system that gets rid of all differences between the two. Still
another is to jettison the panel system and instead create a permanent
tribunal, as discussed supra Part II.B.2. A bonus of the permanent
tribunal system is that it includes nationals of all members in the heart
of the dispute resolution system. The sense of equality and inclusiveness
this fosters would palliate any residual North-South ill-will.326
325. See, e.g., Smith and Whitney, supra note 12, at 598-601 (discussing problems of
integrating Mexican civil and U.S.-Canadian common-law systems). However, the existence
of this problem is not uniformly recognized. One prominent practitioner does not regard the
common law-civil law interface as a problem at all. He points out that although a large
portion of Canada (Quebec) has a civil law system, its interactions with Canada work
smoothly. Moreover, Louisiana seems to have no overwhelming problems with the rest of the
United States. Finally, Great Britain has managed quite well with the continental civil law
system. See Horlick, supra note 117, at 13.
326. It is important to recognize that keeping the option to resort to GATI, see supra
notes 47-52 and accompanying text, (indirectly) also preserves all of the faults of GATT
(e.g., "nullification or impairment," non-binding decisions, "balkanized" dispute settlement,
etc.) in the NAFTA system. One important consideration prevents the author from elaborating
on the topic - the possibility of far-reaching GATT dispute resolution reforms in the
ongoing Uruguay Round negotiations, which may possibly remedy these problems. For
mention of some of these proposed GATT reforms, see supra notes 295-96, 283-85. In any
event, the weaknesses NAFrA shares with GATT are subject to the same criticisms, and
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CONCLUSION
NAFTA is intended to lead to a proposed WHFTA, yet a key com-
ponent of NAFTA - the dispute resolution system - is seriously
flawed from a variety of legal, practical, and systemic perspectives. It
has retained some of the worst characteristics of CUSFTA and GATT:
"nullification or impairment, ' a non-binding general DRM, and a system
prone to "balkanization." Moreover, it has created a potentially volatile
problem of its own: a two-track approach to hemispheric integration,
which sustains and aggravates historical North-South perceptions of
inequality. For the purposes of NAFTA dispute resolution, the system
will probably be adequate. However, before considering the extension of
the NAFTA system into a WHFTA, more thought and effort need to be
invested in order to remedy these problems. Hemispheric integration
requires a more thorough evaluation of trade dispute resolution systems
and the world views behind them than NAFTA provides. Far-reaching
restructuring is in order, not reliance on the institutions of the past.
In failing to design a more carefully crafted dispute resolution
system, NAFTA has created the converse of the parable of the new wine
poured into old wineskins. 3" NAFTA drafters have poured the dregs of
old trade orders and old world views into an opportunity, of great elas-
ticity: the beginning of a new hemispheric trade order. NAFTA had the
flexibility to contain new trade concepts and new visions of North-South
equality. That elasticity was squandered on an old vintage. One hopes
WHFTA will be a different wineskin with new contents.
including them here would serve little purpose. However, if the GATT reforms are far-
reaching and thorough, then resort to GATT may ironically end up salvaging NAF-
TA/WHFTA dispute resolution.
327. Mark 2:22 (recounting parable of old Wineskins that burst because they could not
stretch to accommodate the fermentation of new wine stored in them); Matthew 10:17.
Fall 1993]

